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THE RUSSIAN FOREST INDUSTRY: A CASE OF COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT 
TAXES 
 
Objectives 
This study examines the theories of competitiveness and export taxes and applies these 
theories to the Russian forest industry and the proposed roundwood export taxes that Russia is 
currently implementing. The goal of this study is to provide a well rounded picture of the 
Russian forest industry and to answer questions about what commodities it is competitive in, 
and about how will the export taxes affect its competitiveness and welfare. These goals are 
attained by utilizing various theories and by calculating parameters to better describe the 
Russian forest industry’s current state. This thesis also looks at the global forest sector, its 
politics, and Russia’s place in it, and calculates an optimal export tax for Russia. 
 
Data 
The trade data utilized to calculate the competitiveness of the Russian forest sector is gathered 
from the United Nations Comtrade database and includes 216 commodities classified at the 6-
digit level from 128 countries. RCA and PRODY values are calculated for all commodities 
and an EXPY value for all countries for the year 2006. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations statistics database Faostat is also used to calculate an 
optimal export tax for Russia and Herfindahl Hirschman Indexes for the concentrations of 
global supply and demand for roundwood.  
 
Results 
The Russian forest sector is found to be competitive primarily in products with a low added 
value. The competitiveness of the sector is not below what is expected from a country in 
Russia’s stage of development (measured by GDP per capita). The actual forest sector is 
fragmented in the case of logging, harvesting, and sawmills, and somewhat more concentrated 
in pulp and paper production. Russia is a major world exporter of industrial roundwood and 
hence could benefit from a relatively high export tax on roundwood exports, but the taxes 
currently suggested go even higher than this and are in effect prohibitive to trade. Russia faces 
a more concentrated world demand for its roundwood exports, but also operates in a more 
concentrated supplier market. Russia may be able to encourage investment into its processing 
sector by raising barriers to trade, but the costs of investing in Russia may remain too high to 
make this optimal even with the barriers in place. The main loser in the Russian forest sector 
because of the export taxes will be the logging and harvesting industry, while the main 
winners will be the sawmills and producers of plywood and pulp. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation and the CIS countries 
have experienced a number or rapid transformations unseen in near history. The collapse of 
the state-run communist economy turned these countries into transitional economies, moving 
at various speeds and with multiple setbacks toward becoming  more market oriented 
economies. Russia, as the largest member of these transitional economies and as a close 
neighbour to Finland, has always deserved special attention toward its development.  
 
Immediately following the disintegration of the socialist system Russia experienced a sharp 
contraction in its economy. Old trade contracts were void, and years of government control 
had left Russia’s powerhouse, the industrial manufacturing sector, uncompetitive. Demand for 
Russian products fell both domestically and abroad. The time period of 1991-1998 was 
troublesome, as the country’s central government lacked a clear direction and was unable to 
develop the country in any direction. The unstable political climate was reflected in the poor 
economic performance of Russia’s business sectors. Production quantities plummeted in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors, and for many products they have not returned to the Soviet 
levels even today. 
 
The muddled decade culminated in the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which forced the 
government to devalue the rouble, and which initially devastated the country’s populace and 
foreign investors. Through devaluation Russian products did suddenly become more 
competitive however, and so began Russia’s gradual redevelopment. One of the main drivers 
of growth was the oil and natural gas sector, which benefitted from rising prices and abundant 
domestic resources throughout most of the following decade.  
 
Because of the country’s vast forest resources and its geographic proximity to Finland, the 
forest sector has always been of particular interest to Finnish investors, researchers, and 
policy  makers.  The  Northwest-Russian  forest  “cluster”  has  been  a  major  source  of  raw  
materials and intermediary products to Finnish pulp and paper mills, and the area has been a 
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limited target for investments by Finnish companies as well. Hence the development and 
competitiveness of the Russian forest sector is of great interest. 
 
This interest was further fuelled when Russia announced that it was planning to place an 
export tax on roundwood to further develop its domestic forest sector. Over 80 percent of 
Finnish roundwood imports originate from Russia, and Finland imported approximately 25% 
of its total industrial roundwood utilization in 2006 (Faostat). Russia’s plan to develop its 
forest sector’s competitiveness through means of trade policy warrants thorough investigation. 
 
1.2 Research problem and method 
 
The development of the Russian forest sector may play a large role in the future of its Finnish 
counterpart.  The  sector  has  enormous  potential  in  terms  on  natural  resources,  yet  it  has  not  
been able to become a viable competitor to western producers in more processed products. 
This  thesis  will  take  an  in  depth  look  at  the  Russian  forest  sector  in  terms  of  two  features:  
competitiveness and trade policy. Hence I will divide my research problem also into two parts. 
The questions are: 
 
1. What products is the Russian forest sector competitive in? 
 
2. What are the effects of export taxes on the competitiveness of Russia’s forest sector, as 
well as the welfare of Russia as a whole?  
 
The first of these questions can be quantitatively studied through the use of export statistics 
and trade oriented measures of competitiveness. Export statistics are available at a very 
detailed level in the United Nations Comtrade database, which reports over 95% of world 
trade. Dani Rodrik and Ricardo Hausman developed an index called EXPY, which measures 
the sophistication associated with a country’s exports. The index has been previously used to 
study economy-wide productivity in China, but it is also suited for a more sectoral analysis. In 
addition to the EXPY, Russia’s competitiveness in forest products is studied by calculating 
the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA index) for its most export competitive products. 
The goal is to determine what products the Russian forest sector currently has a competitive 
advantage in, and whether the country has been “left behind” in the development of its forest 
3 
 
sector. To accomplish this, the current state of the sector is analyzed both in terms of 
individual products, and by comparing Russia to other countries in similar (and different) 
stages of economic development.  
 
The second question receives a more qualitative answer. To answer this question this thesis 
will  review  the  effects  of  export  taxes  from  traditional  economic  theory,  and  also  consider  
export taxes as a form of strategic trade policy. The basic effects of an export tax are analyzed 
using Lerner’s symmetry theorem, which stated that the effects of an export tax are 
symmetrical to those of an import tax. This theory is then utilized and extended to consider 
the structure of the Russian forest industry and the effects of imperfect competition on welfare. 
The effects of export taxes will also be studied by comparing the situation in Russia to other 
countries where export taxes have been implemented or abolished. Earlier research on export 
tax  effects  provide  us  with  more  “real  world”  reasons  why  such  trade  policies  might  be  
implemented, and why they might fail or succeed. 
 
1.3 Main results 
 
The competitiveness of the Russian forest industry measured by export competitiveness yields 
fairly straightforward results. Measured by revealed comparative advantage (RCA), the 
industry is primarily competitive in products with a fairly low added value. When this 
measure is taken further and the competitiveness of the industry as a whole is compared to 
other countries with the EXPY indicator, it seems that the Russian forest industry, despite its 
low added value, is at least moderately competitive in relation to it’s income level (gdp per 
capita). While this does not eliminate the possibility of trade policy to improve its 
competitiveness, it goes against the claims that Russia has become only a source of raw 
materials, plundered by more advanced economies for its abundant resources.  
 
The effects of the export  taxes on the competitiveness of the Russian forest  industry and on 
the welfare of Russia are naturally more ambiguous and difficult to predict. By calculating an 
optimal export tax for Russia, taking into account its market power and supply and demand 
elasticities, we can see that the currently proposed export taxes are far above a “welfare-
maximizing” export tax outlined by economic theory. This is hardly a surprise, since these 
export taxes had the stated purpose of being prohibitive to trade and are meant to encourage 
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foreign investment into the country and the development of domestic industry. For this reason 
I  also  touch  upon  a  few  theories  that  deal  with  the  role  of  trade  policy  in  industry  
development. 
 
The development of the domestic industry was looked at in this thesis, first by studying real-
world cases of export taxes and the Russian forest industry, and then by comparing the two 
for similarities and differences. In this way we could make comparisons between the different 
cases. The most important characteristics determining the effects of the roundwood export 
taxes are the concentration and characteristics of domestic supply and demand, as well as 
foreign supply and demand. Foreign supply and demand concentration was estimated using 
the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, while estimates for the domestic concentration were based 
more on earlier research. Results from this were twofold: Russia benefits from significant 
supplier market power while mainly exporting roundwood, but also faces more concentrated 
demand in this product. Both supply and demand were the least concentrated for paper 
production – the direction Russia wants to take with its forest industry.   
 
Russia may be able to encourage production factor movements by raising barriers to trade, but 
it remains unclear whether these barriers do enough to make investing into Russia profitable. 
The hardest hit sector in Russia because of the roundwood export taxes will be the logging 
and harvesting sector. This will also have significant employment effects in many 
communities. The sectors that will benefit the most will be lumber, plywood and to a lesser 
degree pulp producers. This is because roundwood prices represent the most prominent part of 
raw materials expenses for these products.  
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
This thesis attempts to provide a well rounded picture of the Russian forest sector, and the 
effects of export taxes. As it tackles several theories to study a real-world phenomenon, it is 
bound to encounter the rift often apparent between economic theory and reality. This can be 
observed in the study of competitiveness through backward-looking export oriented 
parameters, and in the studying of export taxes mainly through terms-of-trade and efficiency 
effects.  In  the  Russian  forest  sector  case  the  idea  of  industrial  transformation  is  equally  
relevant to the case at hand, but receives less attention because it is not as easily measured.  
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Related to,  but separate from the rift  between theory and practice,  is  the fact  that  a study of 
any real-world phenomena is bound to have to make simplifications and choose certain 
viewpoints. While this thesis has a definite focus on the Russian industry structure, many 
other variables undoubtedly also affect real-world outcomes. Additionally, while I briefly 
look at the forest industry’s position globally and the politics involved, enough can never be 
said about the environment in which trade policy decisions are made. The interest groups and 
agents affecting political decisions are as numerous as the variables affecting outcomes. 
 
The final increases on Russian roundwood export taxes are now on hold because of the world 
economic crisis. In what form they will eventually come to pass remains to be seen and their 
possible cancellation will naturally diminish the relevance of this study. It does not diminish 
the study of the theory behind trade policy and competitiveness, however, nor does it render 
irrelevant the analysis carried out on the structure and competitiveness of the Russian forest 
sector.  
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
 
This  study  begins  with  an  overview  of  the  relevant  theories  of  competitiveness  used  to  
measure countries’ competitive strengths in different commodities. The focus will be 
primarily on revealed comparative advantage and its uses in measuring competitiveness. 
Chapter 2.1 goes over the theory of comparative advantage and the RCA-indicator, and 
chapter 2.2 dwells on the more sophisticated EXPY-indicato. Chapter 2.3 goes over how trade 
policy may have an effect on competitiveness and introduces the idea of tariff jumping to 
encourage factor movements and affect industry structure within countries. 
 
In chapter 3 the focus is on trade policy, and export taxes in particular. It starts with a review 
of  Lerner’s  symmetry  theorem,  the  starting  point  of  all  studies  of  export  taxes.  It  then  goes  
over the theoretical effects of an export tax in chapter 3.2, and provides a method of 
calculating an optimal export tax in chapter 3.3. Chapter 3.4 studies export taxes from a 
strategic trade policy perspective. 
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Chapter 4 takes a more real-world approach to export taxes. Chapter 4.1 goes over the usual 
justifications for export taxes and analyses their merit. Chapter 4.2 goes over two cases of 
export taxes. The first is of placed export taxes on cotton in Pakistan, while the second deals 
with  the  removal  of  export  taxes  on  cashew  nuts  in  Mozambique.  These  provide  a  link  
between the theory of export taxes and the practice and highlight the importance of industry 
structure. 
 
Chapter 5 turns the focus to the Russian forest sector. Chapter 5.1 carries out the actual 
calculations based on chapter 2’s competitiveness indicators and comes up with measures for 
the Russian forest industry’s competitiveness. Chapter 5.2 goes over the situation in the world 
forest sector and places Russia “on the map”. Chapters 5.3 and 5.4 focus on the issues at hand: 
the exports of roundwood from Russia, the politics of forest trade and the planned export 
taxes. 
 
Chapter 6 will utilize the previous chapters to make conclusions about the effects of the 
export taxes on Russian roundwood. Chapter 6.1 compares the Russian case of export taxes to 
the earlier mentioned cases of Pakistan and Mozambique, and delves deeper into the global 
industry concentration of supply and demand for forest products. Chapter 6.2 deals with the 
welfare effects of export taxes on Russia, and calculates an optimal export tax for Russia. 
Chapter 6.3 focuses on the Russian forest industry and the income transfer within the industry 
that the trade policy is bound to instil. Finally, chapter 6.4 will look at export taxes from a 
strategic trade policy perspective in the unique case of Russia. Chapter 7 will present the 
conclusions of the thesis.   
 
2. Theories of competitiveness 
 
Competitiveness in economics usually refers to the ability of countries, industries, or firms to 
prosper in certain market conditions. It is an elusive concept, with few clear indicators. When 
studying the competitiveness of nations, economists usually approach the question through 
theories  of  international  trade.  The  most  common  of  these  are  the  Ricardian  model  and  the  
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of factor endowments, both of which contend that a country can have 
comparative advantage in producing a product. Later on these theories have been 
supplemented with the study of new trade theory, with its emphasis on intra-industry trade. 
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In the following chapter I will address these varying theories of international trade, their 
implications, limitations, and tools. 
 
2.1 Ricardian model of comparative advantage and the Hecksher-
Ohlin Model 
 
The key aspect of the Ricardian model of comparative advantage is that countries can benefit 
from trade not only due to an absolute advantage in producing a good, but due to a 
comparative advantage as well. This comes from the realization that wealth can be created in 
a country by specializing in the production of a good that that country is internally most adept 
at producing, regardless of its competitiveness with others. This is because there is an 
opportunity cost involved when an advantaged country tries to produce all products itself 
instead of focusing on its most comparatively advantaged products. The prime parameter in 
models studying comparative advantage is the Revealed Comparative Advantage indicator, 
also known as the Balassa indicator. It is defined as 
 
             ___Xij / ?iXij___ 
RCAij =   ?jXij / ?i??jXij 
 
Here Xij is the export of sector i from country j. The numerator represents the share of sector i 
in  the  country’s  total  exports,  while  the  denominator  represents  the  percentage  share  of  the  
sector worldwide compared to world exports. The RCA indicator therefore provides us with a 
relationship of how much of a certain good a country exports compared to the rest of the 
world. There are several issues with this indicator. For one it only takes into account exports, 
and additionally it is a backward looking indicator, so it only tells us what the situation in a 
certain sector is now, instead of giving any indication of future potential.  
  
The Hecksher-Ohlin model takes the Ricardian model a step further by introducing factor 
endowments into the mix. In the Hecksher-Ohlin model relative endowments of factors, such 
as capital, labour and land determine the comparative advantage that the country has in 
producing certain goods. Production that is labour intensive is best produced in a country that 
is labour-abundant, and production that is capital intensive is best produced in capital-
abundant countries. This is a difference from Ricado’s model, which only considered labour 
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as the resource, and had technology differences as the source of comparative advantage. The 
Hecksher-Ohlin model assumes identical technology everywhere, and considers the 
differences to arise from different production factor endowments.  
 
The Hecksher-Ohlin model has certain advantages over the Ricardian model particularly 
when viewing transitional economies, such as Russia or former Soviet states. Many of these 
economies are already technologically advanced and therefore in the Ricardian model the 
small technological difference between them gives little reason for trade. The Hecksher-Ohlin 
model on the other hand takes into account the transition economies’ abundant natural 
resources as a cause for trade. Unfortunately, however, the Hecksher-Ohlin model lacks a 
workable performance indicator. 
 
Semir Daskapan (2008) developed a more advanced version of the Ricardian RCA and, also 
an indicator for the Hecksher-Ohlin model in 2008. Both of these indicators take into account 
factor endowments and therefore free the RCA from its traditional dependence on exports. 
The appliance of factor endowments also has its limitations, since factor price data is difficult 
to attain particularly in transitional economies.  
 
2.2 The EXPY-Indicator 
 
Dani Rodrik developed the Ricardian indicator of revealed comparative advantage into a more 
thorough tool for analysing different countries’ export profiles. The indicator Rodrik 
developed is called EXPY, and it  calculates an RCA for all  of a country’s exports,  and then 
compares those parameters with countries’ gross domestic products per capita. This way 
Rodrik was able to group commodities by the development stage of countries exporting them. 
Rodrik’s EXPY consists of first calculating a PRODYk value for good k: 
                         
PRODYk =   ?j ((xjk/Xj) / ?j(Xjk/Xj)) * Yj 
 
The PRODY value is basically the sum of the RCA indicators of all the countries exporting 
good k, multiplied by the per capita GDP of countries exporting said good. After calculating 
the PRODY, we can calculate the EXPYj for country j 
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EXPYj = ?l (xjl/Xj) * PRODY 
 
EXPY  provides  us  with  a  weighted  index  of  the  representative  income  associated  with  a  
country’s exports, where the weight is simply the value share of the product in the country’s 
total exports (Rodrik 2006).  
 
The beauty of Rodrik’s model is that it provides us with export profiles for countries based on 
their standard of living (per capita GDP). While far from perfect, it allows us to visualize 
countries’ performance in exports compared to others in similar development stages. Rodrik 
used the the EXPY model to study China’s exports, and found discrepancies in the advanced 
level  of  China’s  exports  compared  to  the  country’s  relatively  low  level  of  per  capita  GDP.  
Terhi Sipilä (2008) took the model further, and introduced another parameter, the IMPY. The 
role of the IMPY was to model countries based on the sophistication level of their imports in 
an identical manner to the EXPY.  While the model has been mainly used to capture a total 
image of a country’s export profile, it is also well suited to study a particular industry. In the 
case of this thesis that would be the forest industry.   
 
There has been criticism against the EXPY indicator as well. Kumakura (2007) criticized the 
fact that PRODYk is defined as weighted average of Yj, the GDP per capita of  a country j 
=1,2, and PRODYk is linearly related to EXPYj. When studying the relationship between 
EXPYj and nations’ GDP per capitas, both EXPYj and Yj are generally converted to 
logarithms. However, you can not really compare lnEXPYj with lnYk, since lnEXPYj is not a 
linear function of lnYj. It is a logarithm of a linear function of Yj. (Sipilä 2008) 
 
Kumakura presented an alternative method of calculating PRODYk, which he called prodyk: 
 
prodyk =   ?j ((xjk/Xj) / ?j(Xjk/Xj)) * lnYj 
 
From prodyk Kumakura could calculate expyj 
 
expyj = ?l (xjl/Xj) * prody 
 
The expyj indicator represented a linear function of lnYj, and could therefore be compared to 
it. To attain a value comparable with the EXPYj indicator of a country, one needs to calculate 
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the exponential function eexpy.  Kumakura found that since real GDP per capita is distributed 
highly unevenly between countries, the PRODYk values for products were determined largely 
of the per capita GDP’s of wealthy countries. This makes the EXPY values of poorer 
countries highly dependent on their income levels, and makes their export baskets look 
inordinarily sophisticated (Sipilä 2008). In Kumakura’s comment on Rodrik’s study on 
China’s export sophistication, he found that using either Yj or lnYj was highly meaningful to 
the end results.  
 
2.3 Competitiveness through trade policy and tariff jumping 
 
The meters of competitiveness discussed here focus on the export-led performance of a 
country’s industries. The question remains: where does this competitiveness come from? The 
effects of abundant resources are undoubtedly beneficial, but there may also be a role for 
government policy in establishing a competitive advantage in certain areas. 
 
Industrial policy has generally dealt with the government’s role in promoting industries with 
potential. This promotion can take the form of tax exemptions, state monopolies, ensured raw 
materials, price controls, or other beneficial interventions. Industrial policy can also take the 
form of trade policy, where subsidies or taxes steer industry development in a certain way. 
 
A  very  common  case  of  industrial  policy  as  trade  policy  to  develop  competitiveness  is  the  
infant industry policy of import substitution. By placing high tariffs on processed imports a 
country’s internal industry is given an artificial advantage that may allow it to develop “in 
peace” from international competition. The lack of incentives for efficiency this creates are 
largely viewed as damaging to the genuine competitiveness of the industry, but import 
substituting methods are still fairly widely used in developing countries. Another example of 
artificial competitiveness-enhancing trade policy is the often used export-subsidy for certain 
products. Export subsidies may be in place to protect a large interest group, such as 
agricultural produces in the United States and E.U, which have also been protected with 
import tariffs. They may also be granted to provide domestic producers an advantage in 
exporting and hence widen their global market shares. A third method, and the most relevant 
to this paper, is the utilization of export duties, which will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter.  
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The economic theory likely to be most relevant to the Russian export taxes has to do with the 
concept of tariff jumping. By raising tariffs a country can motivate foreign investors can 
“jump” over tariff walls by investing in them. The most systematically presented model of the 
effects of trade policy on industrial structure is presented by Horstman and Markusen in their 
1990 paper Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade. In it they study the effects 
of plant and firm specific costs and tariffs and transport costs from a two country, two product 
(which are imperfect substitutes) game theoretical perspective. In their analysis they found 
that manipulating the different cost variables (such as tariffs) had a notable effect on the 
ultimate market structure: on whether each country had one company and one plant that 
exported to the other, whether each company had a plant in each country, or if one company 
produced in both countries and the other didn’t enter the market at all. The issue was 
originally raised by Robert Mundell in his 1957 paper International Trade and Factor 
Mobility, which concluded that impediments to factor mobility increase trade, and 
impediments to trade increase factor mobility. According to these papers a country’s trade 
policy can have an effect on the structure of the industry that is formed, and on the movement 
of production factors (labour and capital).  
 
Another aspect of increasing competitiveness through industrial or trade policy is the idea of 
technology diffusion, or learning from more experienced agents. Some believe that China has 
utilized this factor in its own economic development. The idea is to invite foreign investors, 
capital and companies to co-operate with domestic producers, and then to learn from them. 
This can be done by providing investors with lucrative duty-free arrangements, encouraging 
joint projects between foreign and domestic companies, or by utilizing market power and the 
exclusiveness of resources to force foreign companies to invest in the country. The last of 
these options can be partly attained by export taxes.   
 
When studying competitiveness and export taxes in this paper it is good to remember that 
competitiveness is a very elusive concept, and the indicators developed for measuring it are 
still rather crude static images of a country’s current level of exports. Indicators such as RCA 
and EXPY do little to measure the potential  competitiveness of a country,  but rather assume 
that that potential has already been realized and is therefore evident in its current export 
statistics. While this imperfection makes them very flawed instruments for measuring true 
competitiveness, their export-oriented approach means that they can be easily measured and 
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A
X   =
  PWX(1-T) 
                                    PAY              PWY 
 
studied in conjunction with export taxes. Export taxes can be expected to have an effect on 
these indicators, and reviewing their current level can say something about the desirability of 
export taxes in a particular case (Russia). 
 
3. Theory of export taxes 
 
Abba Lerner’s symmetry theorem is generally considered to be the fundamental starting point 
for theories on export taxes. The idea that an export tax can act symmetrically to an import tax 
enabled the analysis of this policy tool’s effects against empirical evidence, and laid the 
groundwork for further analysis. Since Lerner, the theory of export taxes has been expanded 
to take into account multi-good, multi-country models, and the effects of imperfect 
competition. The following chapter will focus on the theory of export taxes, and the aspects of 
export  taxes  that  are  most  important  to  competitiveness,  and  their  utilization  in  the  Russian  
roundwood sector. 
 
3.1 Lerner’s symmetry theorem 
 
According to Lerner’s (1936) symmetry theorem an ad valorem duty on exports in a two-
country  two-product  static  long  term equilibrium acts  in  a  symmetric  way to  an  ad  valorem 
duty on imports. The symmetry can also be expressed so, that for every ad valorem import 
duty there is an equal export duty that causes identical equilibrium production and 
consumption, and the same relative prices (McKinnon 1996). Lerner’s symmetry theorem 
includes the assumption that trade between the countries is in equilibrium. 
 
Let us assume, that country A that exports product X and imports product Y places an export 
tax T on product X. The domestic price of product Y remains the same as world price, but the 
domestic price of product X decreases below the world price (PW). 
 
The price relation between the products is at this point: 
 
 
  PAX= PWX(1-T)             ------     ------------ 
 
13 
 
 
The first equation tells that the price of product X in country A is the same as the world price 
of product X multiplied by the effect of the tax: (1-T). In other words the price of product X 
in country A falls below the world price. The second equation tells that the price of product X 
in country A falls compared to product Y because of the tax. 
 
The end result would have been identical had an import tax been placed on product Y. Both 
an import and an export tax raise the price of the imported product compared to the exported 
product in the domestic market and if the exporting country is large, lower the price of the 
imported product in relation to the exported product in the world market. 
 
The Lerner symmetry theorem only applies in sharply delimited circumstances, and hence it 
cannot fully be applied to the real effects of export taxes. Its value is particularly that it 
focuses on relative instead of absolute prices, and enables us to apply the theory of import 
taxes on exports as well. McKinnon (1996) extended the Lerner Theorem to apply to trade 
with three commodities. McKinnon showed that with two countries and three products, where 
a country imports 2 and exports one product, an import duty to one product is equal to an 
export duty to the exported product and a subsidy to the other import. Ray (1975) on the other 
hand  showed  that  the  findings  of  Lerner  and  McKinnon  were  not  robust  in  the  case  of  
imperfect competition. According to Ray, even though export and import duties caused the 
same relative prices, imperfect competition and changing terms of trade cause the effects to 
differ. Blanchard (2005) places 3 requirements on the materialization of the symmetry: 
 
 
The collected export tax is distributed to the consumers in the country 
The export tax and import duties are not prohibitive to trade 
An imbalance of trade between countries is not dependent on whether an export or an import 
tax is used 
 
Blanchard’s  first  requirement  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  when  trade  is  imbalanced  the  
revenues from export taxes will differ from those collected from import duties. As long as the 
government distributes the revenue to the consumers or uses the revenue in a manner identical 
to the consumers, the symmetry holds. Blanchard’s second requirement is already present in 
the  original  theorem:  the  symmetrical  effects  only  apply  in  a  situation  where  there  is  trade.  
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Particularly the third requirement proves difficult to fulfil because of investments between 
countries. According to Blanchard, whether an export or an import tax is used has an effect on 
the profits collected by foreign investors in the country. Both relative and absolute local 
prices affect revenues from investments. The effects of an export tax differ in terms of 
absolute local prices from import duties, so the balance of trade between countries is rocked 
depending on the instrument used (Blanchard 2005). The first and third requirements are 
rarely fulfilled in international trade, and even the second one is on very shaky ground when 
talking  about  Russia’s  export  duties.  Regardless  of  its  limitations,  the  basic  idea  of  the  
symmetry theorem is quite intuitive: export taxes decrease exports and therefore direct 
production into the domestic market, lowering its relative price there but heightening it 
elsewhere.  
 
3.2 The effects of an export tax 
 
An export tax is a restriction on a country’s exports. They are mainly placed on raw materials, 
the exports of which a country wants to reduce to develop its foreign trade in a favourable 
direction. The effects of an export tax can be separated based on whether the setting country is 
a  small  or  a  large  player  in  the  exports  of  the  good/  raw  material  in  question.  To  a  small  
country the effects of an export tax are unequivocally negative, while a large country may 
benefit from an export tax through an improvement in its terms of trade. Terms of trade refers 
to the price of the country’s exports compared to the price of imports. Export taxes are 
relatively rare compared to import taxes, and they have mainly been used by developing 
countries. One reason for this is that they are often large exporters of raw materials. One 
reason for the relatively weak results attained through export taxes may also be that these 
developing countries rarely posses the market power necessary to truly benefit from them.   
 
The effects of export taxes may be divided into welfare-effects and distributional effects. 
Welfare effects refer to the effects of the export tax on the exporting country, the importing 
country, and aggregate welfare. The distributional effect refers to the redistribution of 
revenues to different sectors inside the countries. The welfare effect is formed by the effects 
on the countries’ terms of trade, and efficiency. The terms of trade effect of an export tax may 
be ambiguous but the efficiency effect is always negative. Efficiency refers to how efficiently 
countries allocate inputs to gain maximum utility.  
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If the exporting country is large, placing an export tax may have an effect on a product’s 
world price. When the price rises, the terms of trade of the product improve for the exporter. 
The higher world price for the product lowers demand, however, and hence demand has to 
move to the domestic market, where a price below world price is paid. At the same time the 
country’s efficiency suffers as the production of the exported good decreases because of fallen 
demand and inputs move to originally less productive sectors. The effect of an export tax on 
the importing country is unambiguously negative as both its terms of trade and efficiency 
suffer as it is forced produce the previously imported good at higher cost. (Piermartini 2004). 
 
Figure 1: The effects of an export tax on a large country 
 
 
Source: Helpman & Krugman 1989 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of an export tax on a large country that faces elastic world 
demand (D*) and has a supply function S. If a tax is levied at the rate t, the production of the 
good falls from XF to Xt and internal price of the good in question falls to pt. This reduces the 
sum of producer and consumer surplus by the area 12345. However, the tax yields 
government revenue of 4567. Hence a tax which keeps the trade distortion triangle 125 
smaller than the rectangle 2376 provides the country with a net welfare gain.    
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3.3 An optimal export tax 
 
If the exporting country has monopoly power in world markets we can calculate an optimal 
export  tax for it.  An optimal export  tax maximizes a country’s benefits  in the terms of trade 
by  utilizing  the  price  elasticity  of  world  demand  and  therefore  works  in  exactly  the  same  
manner as an optimal import tax.  
 
If  the  demand  price  elasticity  of  an  exported  product  is  da, an optimal export tax is simply    
T* = ?1/da?, meaning the inverse value of the exported product’s demand price elasticity. 
When determining an optimal export tax critical issues are the market power of the taxing 
country, and the price elasticity of the demand for the product.  
 
The demand elasticity (da ) for exported product can be expressed as a function of aggregate 
demand elasticity (d), the market share of the exporting country (a), and the rest of the 
world’s supply elasticity (s0): 
 
da = (d – s0 (1-a))/a 
 
and since the optimal export tax is T* = ?1/da? 
we get: 
 
T* = a/?d – s0 (1-a)? 
 
In practice the optimal export tax is higher the larger the market share of the exporter (a), the 
lower the price elasticity of aggregate demand (d), and the lower the price elasticity of the rest 
of the world’s supply (s0)  (Lindert, Pugel 1996). An optimal export tax takes advantage of the 
exporter’s market power, but does not take into account the possibility of counter-measures. 
In reality other countries can respond to export taxes with their own trade restrictions. Rodrik 
(1989) and De Santis (2000) have also shown that an optimal export tax should not really be 
calculated for countries, but for companies. An optimal result is achieved when export taxes 
vary depending on the companies’ domestic and foreign market power. Rodrik also 
acknowledges, however, that the results of the investigation, which urge lower export taxes 
for large companies and higher ones for small ones, are not easily applied in practice. A basic 
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prerequisite for an optimal export tax is that it cannot be prohibitive to trade, meaning so high 
as to make trade unprofitable.   
 
3.4 Export taxes as a means of strategic trade policy 
 
Many economists have in past years consistently made the case for trade liberalization as a 
source for economic development and competitiveness. The effects of trade liberalization are 
by no means unambiguous however, and there have also been extensive studies on the role of 
strategic trade policy in the case of perfectly or imperfectly competitive industries and 
economies of scale. As these considerations are very relevant in the case of “real world” 
policy, it is worth studying how trade policy, particularly export policy might affect the 
welfare and competitiveness of a country’s industries. 
 
The pioneering work on the subject of strategic trade policy is Helpman and Krugman’s 
Trade Policy and Market Structure (1989).  In  it  they  argue  that  in  the  case  of  a  perfectly  
competitive market an export tax has a welfare-improving effect while a subsidy deteriorates 
welfare. The source of possible welfare-improvement arises from the export tax’s terms-of-
trade effect.  
 
The welfare improving effects of an export tax are very much reliant of the competitiveness of 
a domestic industry. In a case where the foreign industry is perfectly competitive, we can see 
that the welfare improving effect of an export tax can also be achieved by monopolizing the 
particularly industry with a “national champion”.  
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Figure 2: Profit maximizing behaviour of domestic firms in monopoly, oligopoly, or 
perfect competition 
 
Source: Helpman & Krugman 1989 
 
Figure 2 shows a situation where facing perfectly competitive industries abroad, domestic 
competition can either be perfect, oligopolistic, or a monopoly. If domestic competition is 
perfect, marginal revenues equal the demand curve. It is worth noting that this model is based 
in a situation where there is no domestic consumption of the good in question, so the surplus 
of the domestic country is the surplus of the producers. It can be seen from the Figure 2, that 
the producer surplus would be higher were the industry completely monopolized to a single 
unit, which would maximize surplus with PM at  Xm where its marginal revenue MR meets 
marginal costs MC. In a situation of perfect or oligopolistic competition it becomes clear that 
an export tax can attain this goal. 
 
When focusing on the effects of export taxes in relation to the competitive nature of an 
industry it becomes necessary to define two concepts: perceived marginal revenue and true 
marginal revenue. Perceived marginal revenue is “the increase in revenue that a firm expects 
to receive by producing one more unit, which is always less than the price (because of 
intramarginal  sales)  but  may  exceed  the  true  marginal  revenue  that  would  prevail  if  the  
industry acted in concert” (Helpman & Krugman 1989). The intramarginal sale decrease 
MC 
MR 
MR’ D 
PM 
Pn 
c 
c+t 
Xn    Xm 
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refers to the lower prices the company expects to get as it increases production, but takes 
production by all other companies as given. 
 
The importance of the perceived marginal revenue becomes apparent in the case of 
noncooperative domestic oligopoly. Here the marginal revenue perceived by firms is  
 
MR’ = p(X, p1) + (X/n)p1(X,p1) 
 
Meaning than in an oligopoly situation each firm maximizes its revenue not only taking into 
account the price of foreign imports, but also the output level of its domestic rivals. It is worth 
noting that the perceived marginal revenue curve is a weighted average of the true marginal 
revenue curve (MR(X)) and the demand curve (or inverse demand function p(X)).  
 
MR’(X,n) = (1-1/n)p(X) + (1/n)MR(X) 
 
It this case the government can through public policy measures increase welfare by 
advocating an export tax, which causes the domestic companies to maximize their true 
marginal  revenue.  This  can  be  seen  in  Figure  2,  where  the  domestic  oligopoly,  if  left  to  its  
own devices, would maximize its surplus by producing where perceived marginal revenue 
MR’ meets costs c at Xn with price Pn. In this situation the government can add an export tax, 
which raises the companies’ costs to c+t. Here the companies meet their cost function at the 
monopoly producing quantity Xm and charge PM.  
 
Krugman and Helpman further make the case that with free entry to an industry of increasing 
returns, aggressive export promoting policy has a more detrimental effect to welfare than an 
export tax. The case is particularly clear in a situation where free entry drives profits to zero. 
When  a  product  is  only  exported,  not  consumed  domestically,  the  welfare  gain  that  results  
from  its  export  is  the  profits  net  of  subsidies  and  taxes  earned  by  the  exporter.  With  a  free  
entry subsidies can never raise profits since additional entry into the industry will only drive 
the  profits  back  to  zero,  and  the  subsidy  will  cost  the  government  revenue.  Once  again  the  
optimal policy is an export tax that maximizes government revenue.  
 
The picture gets particularly interesting when we add resource constraints to the picture. I 
shall provide a single example of this. 
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Figure 3: Strategic trade policy with limited resources 
 
Source: Helpman & Krugman 1989 
 
Let us consider a model of two imperfectly competitive industries. The two industries are 
industry 1 with output (X1), and industry two with output (X2). Both industries compete for a 
single, limited resource: S. I have modelled here industry 1 production to be a more perfectly 
competitive industry, with perceived marginal revenue MR’ far above true marginal revenue 
and hence close to world demand, and industry 2 to be a more concentrated industry, with 
perceived marginal revenue to be lower, closer to true marginal revenue. In equilibrium both 
industries are maximizing their perceived marginal revenues (MR’). In this case in principle 
both industries might be eligible for export tariffs, since both are currently producing more 
than they should. Were both to maximize true marginal revenue instead of perceived marginal 
revenue, however, resource distribution should move from E1 to  E2, meaning the more 
competitive industry should produce less, and the more concentrated industry more. 
 
It is clear that these analyses focus on a situation where there is no domestic consumption of 
the good, and hence provide us with an incomplete picture about the effects of strategic trade 
policy. In a situation with domestic consumption one has to take into account the desirability 
of a monopoly/oligopoly situation on the domestic market. I have earlier discussed the effects 
of an export tax on the domestic prices, pointing out the fact that the reduced exports should 
direct supply to the domestic market and therefore lower the price of the good under the 
export  tax.  An  analysis  of  strategic  trade  policy  under  imperfect  competition  suggests  a  
MR1 
MR’1 
MR’2 
MR2 
X1 X2 
S 
E1 
E2 
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somewhat different scenario, where the export tax lowers the production to such a degree 
where domestic consumers have to pay a higher price as well.  
 
4. Export taxes in practice 
 
Export taxes are generally viewed as a policy tool for developing countries. They have been 
used extensively on primary products with the aim of developing domestic industry, or to 
ensure the availability of raw materials to domestic consumers and producers. Among 
employed export taxes by developing countries are taxes on cotton in Pakistan, cashew nuts in 
Mozambique, roundwood in Chile, palm oil and forestry products in Indonesia, copra in the 
Philippines, vanilla, pepper and cloves in Madagascar, petroleum in Russia and sugar in 
Brazil. While they are generally used in developing economies, developed economies are not 
above using them either: in December 1995 the European Union imposed a $32 per ton export 
tax on wheat.  
 
4.1 The arguments for export taxes 
 
According to a study done by Roberta Piermartini to the WTO, the most commonly used 
arguments for export taxes are: 
 
An export tax improves the terms of trade 
In the case of a large country an export tax may improve the terms of trade. The improvement 
is reliant on many uncertainties, however. Importing countries are likely to respond to export 
taxes with tolls and tariffs of their own, and a long-term export tax may motivate the 
development of substituting products. 
 
An export tax reduces volatility in domestic prices and export revenues 
If a country is lacking in developed financial markets, export taxes can even out export 
revenues and make it easier to form long-term plans. The size of the taxes may also be 
dependent  on  the  world  prices  of  the  good.  When  demand  is  high  taxes  can  be  raised,  and  
during low demand the tax can even turn into a subsidy. The compensating effect of the 
export  tax  is  reliant  of  the  ability  of  the  country’s  government  to  commit  to  long-term  
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economic policy, an uncertain assumption when considering of countries that do not even 
have developed financial markets. 
 
An export tax reduces inflation pressure 
An export tax lowers the home price of a product and hence reduces inflationary pressures. 
The inflation-suppressing effect of the tax depends on how important the good in question is 
to the total economy and consumption. The tax only reduces inflation to the extent that 
households consume the product in question. Furthermore, in an oligopolistic market the 
reduced prices never necessarily reach consumers.   
 
An export tax protects and develops infant-industry sectors 
An export tax can be implemented to protect domestic developing business sectors by 
creating an artificial competitive advantage for them. This is particularly true for the 
manufacturing sector, for which an export tax can guarantee lower prices for raw materials. 
An artificial competitive advantage may have the unfortunate side-effect of encouraging 
ineffective business practices, and it may decrease the real competitiveness of domestic 
companies. Export taxes can also be used to motivate foreign investors to invest in the 
country, but the uncertainties in trade policy that export taxes represent may be more likely to 
inhibit investments.  
 
Export taxes may be a response to import duties for a country’s exports 
Many developed countries implement high import tariffs for processed goods, but have no 
taxes for raw material imports. The purpose of this is to import raw materials from developing 
countries  and  to  protect  domestic  processing  industries.  With  a  tax  on  raw  material  exports  
developing countries can even out their terms trade. On the other hand the export tax will 
decrease investments into the taxed sector, and hence weaken the country’s exports. 
 
Export taxes provide a source of revenue for the government 
Export taxes can act as an easy source of tax income for a developing economy. The problems 
arise regarding fluctuations in demand and market price for exported products particularly in 
raw materials markets, the main focus of export taxes.  
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4.2 Examples of export restrictions on raw materials 
 
While there are many arguments for export taxes, and many rebuttals and uncertainties to 
those arguments, it may be beneficial to view few examples of implemented (or discontinued) 
export taxes, and the effects that implementation (or discontinuation) has had on the exporting 
country. Through their rhetoric in the international media, Russian legislators have made it 
very clear that the primary reasons for their placement of export taxes on roundwood are the 
protection of the national pulp and paper industry by reducing competition for raw materials, 
and luring foreign investments into the sector. While there are many uncertainties to how the 
export taxes will affect Russia per se, it is worth investigating previous export taxes placed on 
fairly similar products for the same reason. 
 
4.21 Case Infant industry: Cotton and yarn markets in Pakistan 
 
Darren Hudson and Don Ethridge carried out a study, Export taxes and sectoral economic 
growth: evidence from cotton and yarn markets in Pakistan (1999). Pakistan utilized an 
export tax on raw cotton fibre from 1988 to 1995. The justification for the export tax was the 
government’s wish to develop the country’s yarn industry, which used cotton as a primary 
input. The cost of cotton represented about 50% of the total variable costs in producing yarn. 
The export tax was used to reserve a larger quantity of cotton for the country’s internal use, 
while lowering its price to domestic yarn producers. 
 
The tax was based on a two-price system. The first price was a benchmark price, which was 
set periodically by the government, not the market. The second price was a minimum export 
price which was set daily by the government committee by using the benchmark price. This 
second price was always higher than the benchmark price and was highly correlated with the 
average world offer price of cotton. 
 
In principle it appears that the export tax achieved its purpose: the production and exports of 
yarn increased while the exports of cotton decreased, and production of cotton increased at a 
slower rate than before. 
 
Hudson and Ethridge carried out an econometric simulation of the Pakistani cotton and yarn 
market, where both sectors were analyzed separately under two different scenarios: a scenario 
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of free trade and the (true) scenario of export taxes. Their analysis of the Pakistani cotton and 
yarn sectors yielded some interesting results. First of all, the export tax had a significant 
adverse impact on the cotton sector, as prices of raw cotton decreased even further inside the 
country. The yarn sector of the country grew, but the contribution of the export tax on the 
growth (compared to the free trade scenario) was marginal at best.  
 
There were two potential reasons for the lack of effectiveness of the export tax. First, the 
demand for cotton in Pakistan was highly inelastic, because (in the short run at least) there is 
very little substitutability for cotton in the yarn producing sector. This meant that yarn 
spinning mills did not significantly alter their consumption decisions regarding changes in 
cotton  prices.  This  suggests  a  strong  correlation  between the  effectiveness  of  the  export  tax  
and the demand relationship between the raw product and processing sector (Hudson, 
Ethridge 1999).  
 
The second reason for the limited effectiveness of the export tax may have been the fact that 
Pakistan exported a large portion of its yarn production (from 30 to 70%), and that yarn 
production is a globalized industry with high volumes and low margins. While Pakistan 
protected its yarn spinners from global competition by effectively subsidizing cotton for them, 
the rest of the world was making cost-saving improvements and modernizations in production 
facilities. The below market price that Pakistan’s yarn producers paid for their cotton acted as 
a drag on their own modernization and formation of true competitiveness. Therefore the 
growth the Pakistan yarn industry achieved now through price subsidies could have been 
achieved also by free market competition and investments into the spinning industry.   
 
4.22 Trade liberalization effects: Cashew nuts in Mozambique 
 
The trade liberalization of the cashew nut sector in Mozambique is another well documented 
case of export taxes, or rather their removal. Cashew nut production had been a strictly 
moderated sector in Mozambique until it engaged in negotiations with the World Bank to 
receive assistance. Some of the requirements that the World Bank presented to Mozambique 
in order for it to receive loans were that Mozambique privatize its economically unviable 
cashew processing sector and remove export taxes on cashew nuts. Until then the processing 
sector had been run by a government monopoly, and producer prices had also been fixed by 
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the government. Initially the government privatized the processing sector, and it phased out 
the export taxes a few years later. 
 
Margaret McMillan, Dani Rodrik and Karen Horn Welch carried out a study of the trade 
liberalization in Mozambique When Economic Reform Goes Wrong: Cashews in Mozambique 
(2002), where they study the effects of trade liberalization on different agents in the industry, 
and focus on why trade liberalization did not work out the way it was planned. The important 
insight they have is that market structure (both domestic and global) has a huge influence on 
the effects of trade liberalization (or trade regulation). 
 
The World Bank’s rationale for removing trade restrictions on raw cashews is familiar from 
the economic theories presented earlier: the artificial trade restrictions caused efficiency 
losses because production inputs were directed to an uncompetitive processing sector. In 
addition to this, the export taxes hurt the country’s cashew farmers, a poor lot to begin with, 
who were forced to sell their products to domestic processors at artificially low prices.  
 
McMillan et. al take a look at the Mozambique sector by tracking the welfare of five distinct 
groups: raw cashew producers (farmers), traders and other intermediaries, owners of the 
cashew processing factories, workers employed in the factories and the government. The total 
utility of the cashew sector could be divided into the utilities of these five groups. The 
researchers pay particular attention to the farmers, since they were supposed to be the primary 
recipients of benefits from trade liberalization. The actual effects of trade liberalization could 
be further divided into the export quantity effect, terms-of-trade effect, unemployment effect, 
and trader’s margin effect. The last three of these were to react adversely in the short run, but 
the export quantity was, by conventional economic theory, supposed to make up for this.  
 
By using data of what the actual effects were and comparing them to how trade would have 
continued were the export restrictions to have continued in place McMillan et al. came to the 
conclusion that the export quantity rise and the welfare gain to the Mozambique farmers fell 
far short of what was expected. The reasons for this “failure” of the free markets can be found 
in the structure of the domestic market, the structure of the global market and the country’s 
policies’ credibility (or lack of). 
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First off, it was found that cashew farmers had very little market power in Mozambique. 
Cashew farmers generally had access to only one intermediary trader, who they would sell 
their crop to. These intermediaries needed a license to work, which acted as barrier to entry. 
After  the  export  ban  was  removed,  the  number  of  traders  increased  somewhat  –  unlicensed  
traders also entered the market and gained a competitive advantage by not paying taxes. This 
increase, however, did not much increase the market power of the farmer. Furthermore, 
exports of raw cashews were also under license, and there were only 8 companies in the 
country that exported raw cashews. In other words, domestic buyers for raw cashews had vast 
oligopsony power, and because of licensing costs and informational asymmetries this 
oligopsony power was not really diminished by trade liberalization. 
 
Secondly, the global market for raw cashews was far more concentrated than the market for 
processed cashew. Between 1990 and 2000 India bought 84% of the worlds raw cashew, 
giving it vast monopsony power over Mozambique raw cashew exporters. Since the processed 
cashew market was less concentrated, Mozambique processors were able to get a relatively 
better price for their products than raw materials exporters were.  
 
Thirdly, the trade liberalization had a massive adverse effect on the country’s processing 
industry. In effect 10 000 people in processing lost their jobs. In World Bank calculations 
these people were expected to be employed elsewhere, but perhaps because workers did not 
believe in the longevity of trade liberalization they refused to employ themselves. The 
government was not able to credibly commit to trade liberalization and so workers stayed 
passive. This same belief may have led to the smaller-than-expected increases in cashew nut 
production. Cashew farmers only planted enough trees to replace dying ones, but production 
did not particularly increase. This may have also been because cashew production did not 
become a particularly more inviting industry after liberalization, as most of the benefits were 
eaten up by oligopolistic intermediaries.  
 
The case of Mozambique does not study the effects of instituting export restriction, but rather 
removing them. Still, it is particularly illuminating because it focuses attention on a very 
important aspect: the structure of the domestic, and the global market. The role of imperfect 
competition on both sides of the border cannot be underestimated when assessing the effects 
of trade policy. 
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5. The Russian forest sector 
 
Approximately 20 % of the world’s forest resources are located in Russia, and industrial 
production from forest resources accounts for approximately 5 percent of Russia’s total 
manufactures. The role of the forest industry varies greatly between regions. Particularly in 
North-West  Russia  the  role  of  the  industry  is  very  large.  Fifty  percent  of  Russian  forests  is  
wood suitable for pulp production, 30 % is large logs for construction, and 20 % is wood fuel 
(Kyyrönen 2009). Of the total value of the forest sector approximately 43% is formed by pulp 
and paper, 40 % is formed by wood and wood products and 17 % by harvesting (Karvinen et 
al. 2005). Production in the forest industry fell sharply during the 1990’s but has since 
recovered for nearly all production fields.  
 
Figure 4: Production of different forest products in Russia 1992-2007 
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Figure 4 shows the development in different product categories’ production from 1992 to 
2007. While the production of most product groups has increased strongly since the 1990’s, 
production is still pretty much at the level of 1992, and far lower for sawnwood. In addition to 
these product groups it is worth noting that production of certain other products, such as 
plywood, fibreboard, and veneer sheets has also increased notably in the past 10 years.  
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The forest industry has its roots in the Soviet planned economy, hence efficiency has been 
weak. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the forest industry suffered from a collapse of 
internal demand and investments into infrastructure came to a halt. The field still suffers from 
very low efficiency. Figure 5 provides us with the value added per worker in different sectors 
of the Russian economy. The table leaves out the petroleum manufacturing industry, as its 
unusually high value (325 865 Euros) is in no way representative of the general level of 
manufacturing in Russia. Things that are worth noting about Figure 5 are the very low value 
added per worker in the manufacture of wood and wood products, and the fairly average level 
of value added per worker in the pulp and paper industry (with printing and publishing 
included) compared to other capital intensive manufacturing sectors such as machinery and 
equipment, electronic equipment, and transport equipment.  
 
Figure 5: Value added per worker in different manufacturing sectors in Russia in 2007 
(EUR) 
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Source: Rosstat, ILO 
 
When comparing these values to those taken from EU countries, it becomes clear that most 
manufacturing sectors in Russia are badly left behind in worker productivity. The average 
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value added per worker in the pulp and paper industry in the EU-27 was (in 2005) over 110% 
higher than in Russia in 2007. For wood products the difference was 160 %. In Russia the 
equipment is old, labour productivity low and infrastructure tolerable at best. 
 
The 1998 devaluation of the rouble and revitalization of global demand have turned exports of 
the Russian forest industry on an upward path, but profitability is still weak. An exceptional 
characteristic in the Russian forest industry is that the forests are owned by the federal 
government, and are only rented to companies. The rental times vary between 1-99 years, but 
because of the burdens set by a long rental time (the company is obligated to observe more 
sustainable harvesting practices and forest care in longer leases) most leases are below 5 years 
(Mutanen et al. 2005). Land ownership is a very political issue in Russia, and the government 
may directly or indirectly support domestic companies through lease contracts.  
 
The further processing of the forest industry is fairly concentrated in Northwest Russia in the 
Arkhangelsk, Karjala, and Vologda regions. The industry is mainly focused on low value-
added products, such as pulp, plywood, and newspaper. There are several major forestry 
conglomerates in Russia that carry out the whole manufacturing process themselves, from the 
harvesting of the wood to the production of paper or cardboard. The size of the companies is 
small on a global scale. The largest Russian forest industry company Ilim Pulp’s  annual sales 
turnover was USD 1,8 billion (2007). The same year the Finnish Stora Enso had an annual 
sales turnover of EUR 13,4 billion Euros, and the largest forest industry company in the world, 
International Paper had an annual sales turnover of almost USD 22 billion. The internationally 
small size of these companies tells little about their market power in their home market. Ilim 
Pulp is, according to its own information, the largest company in Europe in terms of forest 
resources and harvesting volume. The group’s mills account for 65 % of Russia’s pulp 
production, and 25 % of board production. (Ilim Pulp homepage).   
 
The Russian pulp and paper industry is highly concentrated, and a dozen of the largest mills 
produce about 75 per cent of total production. The rest of the mills are usually small and 
outdated, and struggling with severe difficulties (Kortelainen 2004). With a few exceptions 
almost all of the major mills have joined investor networks such as Ilim Pulp (which controls 
the Koryazhma, Ust-Ilimski and Bratski pulp and paper mills (PPM)), Titan Group 
(Arkhangelsk PPM), Continental Management (Baikal PPM, Yenisei PPM), and Sveza Group 
(several plywood mills). Some large players that have not joined investor groups have been 
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sold to foreign investors. Examples of these are the Syktyvkar PPM, which was sold to South 
African  Mondi  Group,  and  Svetogorsk  PPM,  sold  to  International  Paper.  In  short  there  has  
definitely been a consolidation of power in the forest industry in the past years. The fight for 
the ownership of these companies has been rough and has on occasion bordered on illegal 
activities. Many of the major players in the major groups have been active political figures in 
the past, and the companies are still considered to hold certain clout especially with local 
governments in the areas they operate.  
 
The forest sector employs a little below 900 000 people in Russia and many operations are 
still carried out with manual labour because of relatively low labour costs. In 2004 Finland 
produced as much or more chemical forest industry products as Russia, but there were 9 times 
more people employed in Russia (Piispa et al. 2006). The labour intensity of the Russian 
forest sector is particularly visible in the harvesting and wood-working industries. 
Approximately  78  %  of  Russia’s  forest  resources  are  located  in  the  Asiatic  region,  and  the  
other 22 % in the European region (Mutanen et al. 2005). Most of the eastern forest resources 
are left untapped because of insufficient infrastructure. Forest resources are best utilized in the 
northwest, where both harvesting and processing work at near full capacity (Piispa et al. 
2006). 
 
The  competitiveness  of  the  national  forest  industry  is  based  on  vast  underutilized  forest  
resources, decent infrastructure in the North-West, cheap energy and a well educated, fairly 
cheap workforce. (Karvinen 2005). Domestic demand has for now remained low, but it is 
expected to rise faster in the future. Investments into domestic capacity have also been low 
because of underdeveloped financial markets, the difficulty of attaining a loan, and the low 
interest displayed by domestic investors towards the forest industry when more lucrative 
sectors, such as energy and metals keep bringing in higher returns (Karjalainen 2005). The 
Russian market has attracted foreign investments, but the low protection the country’s 
legislation offers acts as a burden on them. The weak infrastructure, heavy bureaucracy, 
differences in operational cultures, and uncertainty about the future are also restrictive factors 
(Karjalainen et al. 2005). Tradition from the Soviet Union has led to forest industry 
companies acting as mainstays for entire communities, providing employment for whole 
villages as well as public services and infrastructure. This wide version of corporate social 
responsibility means heavy added expenses for foreign investors.  
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The primary goods production of the Northwest Russian forest cluster was studied by 
Dudarev et al. in 2004 and is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Primary goods production of the Northwest Russian forest cluster 
 
Raw Materials Intermediary products Final products 
Raw wood Sawn Timber 
Plywood 
Market pulp 
Sack paper 
Newsprint 
Wrapping paper 
Paperboard 
Corrugated board 
Wallpaper base 
Tissue base 
Furniture 
Tissue 
Sacks 
Folding boxes 
Writings 
Wallpaper 
Source: (Dudarev et al. 2004) 
 
Since the Northwest area is the most developed in the country, and even it focuses mostly on 
raw materials or intermediary products, we can expect that the industry as a whole is still 
quite undeveloped. 
 
5.1 Competitiveness of the Russian forest industry 
 
Theories  of  competitiveness  were  discussed  earlier  in  this  paper.  The  most  commonly  used  
economic framework for studying the competitiveness of an export-oriented sector is the 
Ricardian model of comparative advantage and its variations. By utilizing export data attained 
from the UN Comtrade system we can make some rudimentary observations regarding what 
export products Russia currently has a comparative advantage in, and how this advantage has 
developed over time. 
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The Ricardian revealed comparative advantage indicator (RCA) was calculated as follows: 
 
             ___Xij / ?iXij___ 
RCAij =   ?jXij / ?i??jXij 
 
The RCA compares the portion of a certain good in a country’s export basket to the portion of 
that good in global exports. The products in which Russia has the highest RCA factor we’re 
calculated in chapter (2-digit), heading (4-digit) and item level. Altogether RCA indicators 
were calculated for 216 items under 67 headings and five chapters. 
 
Table 2: Products with the highest RCA indicator in the Russian forestry sector in 2006 
 
# Headings RCA 
4403 Wood in the rough or roughly square 12,73 
4406 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-ties of wood) 5,10 
4407 Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise 2,79 
4801 Newsprint, in rolls or sheets 2,47 
4702 Chemical wood pulp, dissolving grad 2,20 
4704 Chemical wood pulp, sulphite, other 2,03 
4412 Plywood, veneered panels and similar 1,78 
4910 Calendars of any kind 1,54 
4703 Chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphat 1,42 
4804 Uncoated kraft paper and paperboard 1,16 
     
# Items RCA 
440320 Untreated coniferous wood in the rough 16,45 
470411 Unbleached coniferous chemical wood pulp 14,90 
440399 Wood, not elsewhere specified, in the rough 11,02 
470311 Unbleached coniferous chemical wood pulp 9,30 
440391 Oak wood in the rough 6,74 
440610 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-ties of wood) 5,67 
441212 Plywood with >=1 outer ply of non-coniferous 5,58 
440690 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-ties of wood) 4,71 
480421 Unbleached sack kraft paper, uncoated 4,06 
441111 Fibreboard of a density >0.8g/cm3,  3,67 
Source: Comtrade 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the most export competitive products in the Russian forest sector 
are products that require little processing. Untreated coniferous wood is clearly the most 
competitive products, but it may be somewhat surprising that chemical wood pulp is also a 
very competitive commodity. It pays to bear in mind, however, that in the forest sector 
unbleached chemical wood pulp is considered an intermediary product with little processing 
required.  
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Figure 6: The development of RCA in main product categories 1996-2006 
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Source: Comtrade 
 
What  can  be  seen  from Figure  6  is  that  there  has  been  a  slight  gradual  decline  in  the  RCA 
index of wood pulp and paper & paperboard, while the RCA of wood and articles of wood has 
remained comparatively stable after strong increases in the end of the 90’s. Based on this it 
would seem that the Russian forest industry has shifted away from products with a higher 
added value and focused on products that require little processing. Naturally this is a very 
crude estimate, since there may be many other reasons for the (relatively) diminishing exports 
of wood pulp and paper from Russia. One likely reason is the reinvigoration of domestic 
demand for these products, especially since production of these has still risen (see Figure 4).  
 
While the RCA indicators of different products provide us with a measure of what products 
Russia is currently competitive in, we need to also look at Russia’s export basket relative to 
its  standard of living. By calculating the EXPY indicator for the Russian forestry sector,  we 
can compare the relative sophistication of Russia’s wood products export basket to that of 
other  countries,  and  get  an  idea  of  whether  or  not  Russia  “lags  behind”  in  the  level  of  
sophistication of its wood products exports.  
 
In the past the EXPY indicator has been used to look at the totality of a country’s exports, and 
determine from there their level of export sophistication. In this thesis the focus is on wood 
exports,  so  the  indicator  has  to  be  slightly  modified.  The  data  for  the  analysis  was  gathered  
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from the UN Comtrade database for the year 2006, before the first export taxes came in to 
effect. The products were divided based on the HS92 classification, because this yielded the 
most  specific  six  digit  commodity  titles  for  the  largest  number  of  countries.  The  analysis  
included wood products export trade statistics for 128 countries, and 216 products.  
 While in the original PRODYk the  portion  of  a  certain  good  in  a  country’s  exports  is  
compared to the country’s total exports, in this analysis it is compared to the country’s total 
wood products exports, meaning that in 
 
PRODYk =   ?j ((xjk/Xj) / ?j(Xjk/Xj)) * Yj 
 
Xj is actually the total value of the country’s wood products exports. By making this change 
I’m avoiding artificially “punishing” countries for not exporting large amounts of wood 
products. The downside of this is that a large percentage of wood products exports as a 
portion of total exports might itself be an explaining factor of welfare (meaning GDP per 
capita). The same change applies to the calculation of the EXPYj. 
 
EXPYj = ?l (xjl/Xj) * PRODY 
 
Since most countries did not report exporting every kind of wood product, non-reported wood 
products were assumed to be 0. This may of course be false, since underreporting may also be 
an indicator of export sophistication, or welfare. There is, however, no way of separating 
underreported exports from nonexistent ones.  
 
Rodrik’s model has been challenged by Kumakura (2007), who preferred using lnYj instead 
of Yj in calculating PRODYk, which he called prodyk. This thesis will include both variations 
in calculating PRODYk (prodyk) and EXPYj (expyj) indices.   
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The first values to be calculated are the PRODY indices to the different wood products: 
 
Table 3: The commodities with the highest and lowest PRODYk values 
 
Highest 
Number Commodity PRODY 
480210 Hand-made paper and paperboard 58385 
441139 Fibreboard of a density >0.35g/cm3  55238 
481121 Self-adhesive paper and paperboard 51611 
480830 Kraft paper, creped or crinkled 44584 
480260 Paper... (>10% of mechanical fibres) 38221 
480253 Paper... (excl. mechanical fibres), 37103 
481031 Kraft paper..., bleached, >95% chem 35125 
481131 Paper..., coated... with plastics,  34247 
480452 Kraft paper..., weighing >=225g/m2, 33004 
481021 Light-weight coated paper for writing 32794 
Lowest 
Number Commodity PRODY 
481012 Paper..., coated with kaolin, etc,  5106 
480523 Multi-ply paper... two outer layers 5094 
480791 Straw paper and paperboard, in rolls 5094 
482020 Exercise-books 4960 
441291 Plywood, atleast one layer particle board 4739 
441900 Tableware and kitchenware, of wood 4734 
480710 Composite paper..., laminated  4536 
480521 Multi-ply paper and paperboard 3890 
442010 Statuettes and other ornaments 3778 
440500 Wood wool; wood flour 2039 
Source: Comtrade 
 
The PRODYk values of different products vary wildly, from hand-made paper and paperboard 
with a value of 58 385, to wood wool and flour with a value 2 039. It is also clear, that there is 
a discrepancy between the actual “sophistication” of products, the amount of processing 
required, and the sophistication presented by the PRODYk values.  
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Table 4: The commodities with the highest and lowest prodyk values 
Highest 
Number Commodity prody 
480830 Kraft paper, creped or crinkled 10,63 
481121 Self-adhesive paper and paperboard 10,61 
441139 Fibreboard of a density >0.35g/cm3  10,53 
480210 Hand-made paper and paperboard 10,52 
481031 Kraft paper..., bleached, >95% chem 10,40 
470500 Semi-chemical wood pulp 10,35 
481131 Paper..., coated... with plastics,  10,31 
481021 Light-weight coated paper for writing 10,29 
480260 Paper... (>10% of mechanical fibres) 10,27 
470100 Mechanical wood pulp 10,26 
Lowest 
Number Commodity prody 
441219 Plywood, each ply =<6mm thick, nes 8,06 
441299 Plywood, veneered panels and similar 8,03 
491191 Pictures, designs and photographs 8,03 
440820 Specified tropical wood veneer sheets 8,01 
441291 Plywood, atleast one layer particle board 8,00 
482020 Exercise-books 7,93 
442010 Statuettes and other ornaments, of  7,88 
440310 Wood in the rough..., treated with  7,65 
482010 Registers, account books, order and 7,41 
440500 Wood wool; wood flour 7,23 
Source: Comtrade 
 
The prodyk values depict a lower variance, with the highest, creped or crinkled kraft paper, 
having a value of 10,63, and the lowest ,wood wool or flour, with a value of 7,23. In general 
the products with a high PRODYk value are also products with a high prodyk value, with the 
top  10  of  each  sharing  8  commodities.  The  same  cannot  be  said  for  the  products  with  low  
PRODYk or prodyk values though, as only 4 out of 10 commodities were shared between the 
different calculation methods.  
 
After calculating the PRODY indicator we can use it together with the country/product 
market shares (?l (xjl/Xj)) calculate an EXPYj value  for  every  country.  By  calculating  the  
EXPYj with Rodrik’s method we get the following high- and low-EXPY countries. 
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Table 5: The countries with the highest and lowest EXPYj values 
Highest Lowest 
Country EXPY Country EXPY 
Luxembourg 35281 Malawi 9605 
Qatar 31196 Gabon 9109 
Norway 24860 Uganda 8891 
Finland 24117 Burundi 8783 
Korea 22381 Mongolia 8423 
Brunei 22339 Guyana 7932 
Japan 21774 Cameroon 7741 
Sweden 21486 Ghana 7696 
Switzerland 20922 Gambia 6958 
France 20799 Maldives 3778 
Source: Comtrade 
 
The countries with the highest and lowest EXPY indicators are hardly surprising, with high-
welfare European countries representing the most export-sophisticated countries and 
underdeveloped African nations representing the least sophisticated wood products exporters.  
 
The listing does not change much when calculating countries’ expy values. Expy is here 
presented as eexpy, to easier compare it with EXPY. Once again Luxembourg, Finland, Qatar, 
and Norway lead the way. The lower end of the spectrum is more varied, yet most of the same 
countries are in the bottom ten of each calculation method. 
 
Table 6: The countries with the highest and lowest eexpy values 
Highest Lowest 
Country eexpy Country eexpy 
Luxembourg 21367 Namibia 4785 
Finland 16860 Mongolia 4721 
Qatar 16335 Cameroon 4445 
Norway 15922 Malawi 4443 
Korea 15712 Guyana 4160 
Sweden 14626 Ghana 4102 
Japan 14457 Uganda 4096 
Bahrain 13739 Gambia 3146 
Switzerland 13642 Burundi 2765 
Canada 13484 Maldives 2634 
Source: Comtrade 
 
 
Finally,  we  can  compare  the  EXPY  values  of  different  countries  to  their  purchasing  power  
parity corrected gross domestic products’ per capita. These two are bound to have some 
correlation, since EXPY is essentially calculated utilizing the GDP per capita values. 
However, the large number of countries and products mean that a single country’s GDP per 
38 
 
capita does not have much of an effect on the PRODYs of different products, and hence the 
relationship to EXPY remains limited in a mechanical sense. Russia is presented in the chart 
with a different colour marker. 
 
 
Figure 7: The relationship between GDP per capita and EXPY 
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The correlation coefficient between lnEXPY and lngdp is a fairly high 0,7, and we can see 
from figure 7 a clear trend of high GDP per capita countries having a similar export basket 
and likewise for low income countries, although the variance seems larger in their case of 
poor countries.  
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When looking at the comparison between lngdp and expy, Kumakura’s modification to 
Rodrik’s EXPY, the results are very similar: 
 
Figure 8: The relationship between GDP per capita and expy 
7
7,5
8
8,5
9
9,5
10
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
lnPPPgdp
PP
P
ex
py
 
Since expy is originally calculated on utilizing lnY and hence it’s variance is much smaller 
than EXPY’s, there is no need to convert it into a logarithm (again). Basically the application 
of expy instead of EXPY increases the variance of the parameter somewhat, and increases the 
correlation between the two variables (from 0,7 to 0,79). It makes the trend between a higher 
expy value and a higher GDP per capita even clearer. 
 
The point of interest in both of these figures is really the location of Russia. Russia’s location 
on the chart has in both cases been market with a diverging colour. It’s value in EXPY is 
(10.39, 9.49) and in expy it is (9.21, 9.49). In both cases the country is located near, but 
slightly above the trendline.  
 
So what can we surmise from this? While Russia’s forest product exports are not particularly 
developed, as could be seen from their RCA indicators, Russia has not been “left behind” in 
terms of modernization either. Russia’s export basket represents the type of export basket a 
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country in that development stage would export. This does not mean that trade policy could 
not  be  used  to  improve  Russia’s  situation,  but  it  does  mean  that  Russia’s  current  level  of  
export sophistication is by no means unusually low.  
 
5.2 The world forest industry and Russia 
 
The world forest industry has faced challenging times in recent years. Competition has been 
high, developing countries have increased production, and prices for paper have fallen. 
Somewhat surprisingly, according to a study conducted by Ernst & Young in 2007, high 
value-added processors have fared the worst in profitability. Market pulp producers and 
purchasers of paper products (such as publishers and commodity producers) have fared well, 
but paper producers have failed to benefit from their products’ higher processing level. Most 
of the added value in the forest products industry is created in the beginning and at the end of 
the processing chain, and the role of paper and cardboard in the total value added of wood 
products is only about 5% (Ernst & Young, 2007) 
 
Forest products production is a cyclical industry, and recent years have seen vastly expanding 
production capacity, particularly in developing countries in South America. This expansion 
has led to excess capacity, and the highly fragmented industry now faces pressures for 
consolidation. Consolidation pressures are further amplified by the sector’s cyclical nature. 
 
Another future challenge for the forest industry is the reduction is paper usage in many 
developed countries. Technological innovations such as computers and electronic databases 
have reduced paper’s role as a medium for data storage. This development is likely to 
continue,  and  to  spread  to  developing  countries  as  well,  as  their  technologies  improve.  The  
paper industry in Finland has in recent years focused more on packaging and on making new 
high-tech innovations from paper. These innovations may prove to be the future of the forest 
products industry, but this transformation will also require a notable transition period. 
 
Russia has so far focused on the low end processing part of the forest industry: roundwood, 
sawnwood, and pulp. It is now attempting to transform its industry toward more value-added 
products, but it is a relevant question to ask whether this would necessarily even be desirable. 
Chapter 6.1 further highlights the relevance of this question by looking at the concentrations 
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of different levels of forest production. The aim to develop production toward higher levels of 
sophistication makes sense, particularly as Russia possesses vast natural resources and hence 
a natural advantage in the field. Still, the transition the industry currently faces may make a 
transition from raw materials to processed goods production unprofitable at least in the short 
term.  
 
5.3 Exports of roundwood from Russia 
 
Russia is the world’s largest exported of roundwood. In 2006 Russia’s exports of coniferous 
and non-coniferous roundwood accounted for 43,1% and 42,1,3% of world exports 
respectively. Russia’s share in the export of these commodities has grown strongly since 1996, 
when Russia’s share in world exports of coniferous wood was only 15,7%, and its share in 
non-coniferous exports was 19,1%. The largest purchasers of Russia’s roundwood were China 
(37% of Russia’s roundwood exports), Finland (32%), Japan (14%) and Sweden (6%) (Piispa 
et al. 2006). In the year 2002 approximately 30 % of Russia’s roundwood exports were 
directed into Europe, and of this number over 80% go to Finland and Sweden. In 2006 27% of 
roundwood production and 72% of sawnwood production were exported. (Faostat, 2008) 
 
Figure 9: Value of forest product exports 1992-2006 
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Especially China’s demand is expected to rise, as China has limited its own loggings because 
of fears of the Yangtse flooding. Over 80% of Chinese and Finnish roundwood imports come 
from Russia (Roberts 2007). According to Russian producers the large foreign demand for 
roundwood has for its part weakened the development of Russia’s own forestry sector, as 
local companies have to compete for the roundwood with foreign buyers. This perceived 
competition for raw materials can only be justified in North-West Russia, where the forest 
resources are highly utilized. For most of the country raw wood is amply available, it is 
processing capacity that is scarce. Russian producers of roundwood are, like the other forestry 
companies in the country, fairly small and unprofitable. One large reason for the lack of 
profitability is the earlier mentioned wide social responsibility left behind by the Soviet times 
(Mutanen et al 2005).  
 
The exports of Russian roundwood can be divided into the exports of coniferous and non-
coniferous roundwood. Due to the high price of coniferous wood, and domestic demand for 
the non-coniferous variety, most of Russia’s exports is of the coniferous variety. For 
coniferous wood the bulk of exports goes to China, while Finland buys up 80% of the non-
coniferous roundwood. Even though domestic demand has increased, particularly for birch, 
there’s still surplus supply due to legislation, which binds tenants of mixed forests to fell the 
non-coniferous trees alongside the coniferous ones (Mutanen ym. 2005). 
 
Roundwood as such is not a very profitable item to export. Transporting logs is relatively 
expensive compared to lumber, plywood and pulp. This is because the lumber extracted from 
logs is only about half of the volume of roundwood. In addition to this, dried lumber is lighter 
and therefore easier to transport. In most of the world roundwood is processed relatively close 
to  where  it  is  felled.  This  raises  the  question:  why  does  Russia  export  so  much  of  its  
roundwood? 
 
According to a study by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC 2007) there are a 
few possible explanations for this. One is that there are foreign barriers to exports of more 
processed forest products from Russia. Russian Prime Minister Putin has repeatedly blamed 
more developed economies and China for restricting access of Russian manufactures in their 
markets. These barriers can also take the role of foreign subsidies on wood processing, which 
artificially make foreign wood processors more competitive. This may be particularly true 
with  China.  Another  explanation  is  that  manufacturing  costs  in  Russia  are  simply  too  high.  
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This  explanation  is  closely  related  to  the  competitiveness  of  the  Russian  forest  sector.  After  
years of no investment in fixed capital and little progress in production practices, the Russian 
forest  sector  simply  cannot  compete  in  processing  with  the  low labour  costs  of  the  Chinese  
and the highly efficient mills of Europe.    
 
As mentioned before, the structure of the logging industry is highly fragmented, with a large 
number of small logging companies operating regionally. The largest of these companies sell 
roundwood to directly to foreign producers, while smaller companies sell their product to 
intermediaries that organize the actual exports. In any case the number of buyers is not high: 
in North-West Russia a logging company faces approximately five buyers for its roundwood 
production, and North-West Russia is the most functional wood products market in Russia. 
When travelling eastward, the number of buyers falls, and the distance a company has to 
transport its logs if they want to consult another buyer rises rapidly. This is important because 
it highlights the relative lack of market power these companies experience compared to the 
trading partners. Many Finnish companies also have their own logging company in Russia 
that provide them with roundwood. (Kyyrönen 2009)  
 
5.4 The politics of forest trade 
 
In  terms  of  trade  policies  the  world  forest  industry  is  quite  varied.  The  elimination  of  trade  
barriers involved in WTO negotiations has reduced them, but many countries still employ 
various domestic protectionist policies.  
 
Trade restrictions if forest trade are not widely employed in the E.U.. Some E.U. countries do 
provide state aid to pulp, paper and wood processing products though, often in the form of 
grants, loans and loan guarantees for capacity expansion. Projects in Eastern Germany have 
been promoted as stimulus to economically depressed regions, but they also provide German 
manufacturers with an artificial advantage over their neighbours. The European Union has 
approved these projects under is “multisectoral framework on regional aid for large 
investment projects”. (AF&PA 2005) 
 
In addition to investment subsidies the E.U. employs a wide array of technical requirements to 
wood product imports. While these technical requirements are primarily employed to prevent 
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either pest infestation or illegal logging, some trading partners view them as being 
unreasonably strict. 
 
China  has  removed  many  of  its  tariffs  in  recent  years,  but  it  still  consciously  structures  its  
trade policy to support industry development from unprocessed to processed goods. China has 
structured its tariffs to encourage imports of raw materials versus finished products, provides 
policy loans, subsidies and preferential tax policies to domestic enterprises to invest in forest 
resources, processing operations and capacity expansions, and has expanded its border trade 
value added tax provisions to allow for large increases in low cost wood imports (AF&PA 
2005). This means that China compensates part of the increased roundwood tariffs to its saw 
mills.   
 
India employs highly restrictive import tariffs with initial rates reaching upward of 40-60% 
and applied rates for most products linger at 30%. In combination, the tariffs and taxes and 
other surcharges result in a rate of 59,3% for veneer products and plywood and a rate of 35% 
for lumber imports. Higher import tariffs are attached to value-added products. (AF&PA 2005) 
 
Japan has been very unwilling to liberalize its forest trade. Japan justifies high import tariffs 
on wood products on ecological grounds. According to Japanese representatives liberalized 
wood products trade would decimate forest reserves both inside and outside the country. 
Some of its implemented trade barriers have even been announced as attempts at meeting 
Kyoto protocol obligations. Aside from import tariffs, Japan also employs subsidies to its 
domestic industry, and restrictive codes that reduce its timber imports.  
 
Despite Russian claims that Finland has effectively banned the exporting of roundwood, 
Finland actually does not employ trade barriers in forest products trade. Finland has no tariffs, 
quotas, or bans in place for any forest products.   
 
Russia’s own forest trade policy has varied greatly over the years. During the Soviet Union 
forest product prices we’re negotiated biannually with trade partners, and trade was based on 
that. Finnish procurement of roundwood from Russia was negotiated through a Finnish 
trading house called Thomesto until 1990 (Kyyrönen, 2009).  
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After the collapse of the communist system prices have been determined more or less by 
market forces. Russia initially attempted a roundwood export tax in the 90’s, but taxes were 
quietly dropped as there was insufficient domestic demand for domestic production, 
particularly in non-coniferous logs. For a long time Russia held an export tax for sawnwood, 
which was only dropped in 2008. In 2008 Russia implemented an import tax for eucalyptus 
pulp, apparently to protect its domestic market from Asian pulp producers. There is also an 
import tax on paper, and in the beginning of 2009 Russia extended an import tariff on forestry 
tractors, which are used to fell and transport logs. This may be in part another restriction on 
the logging companies, or merely a way to support domestic machine building, such as the 
Onega Tractor Plant. (Kyyrönen 2009) 
 
5.5 The Russian roundwood export taxes 
 
Counsellor Hannu Kivelä presented the following schedule for the implementation of 
roundwood export tariffs in Russia: 
 
Table 7: The schedule for roundwood export taxes 
 
01.07.2007 20% minimum 10 euros/m3, applies to spruce, pine, and over 15 cm birch 
10% min 5 euros/m3, applies to aspen 
01.04.2008 25% minimum 15 euros/m3, applies to spruce, pine, and over 15 cm birch 
10% min 5 euros/m3, applies to aspen 
01.01.2009 80% minimum 50 euros/m3, applies to spruce, pine, aspen, and over 15 cm 
birch* 
 
01.01.2011 80% minimum 50 euros/m3, applies to spruce, pine, aspen and birch* 
Source: Kivelä (2007)   
*postponed for now 
 
Representatives of Russia have reported that the main reason for increased export tariffs is to 
motivate foreign investors to invest in Russia. Despite its possession of the worlds largest 
forest reserves, the country’s forests are badly underutilized and infrastructure is old and worn 
down. By raising export taxes the government believes it can get foreign companies to invest 
in processing operations inside the country. 
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In his annual speech in 2007 the former president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, expressed his 
concern over the utilization of Russia’s natural resources. In his speech Putin worried about 
whether the country’s vast natural resources are used in a way that will enrich future 
generations of Russians. One way to ensure this is to develop further forestry processing 
manufacturing inside the country. The export tariffs are supposed to secure supply for 
domestic companies, which currently suffer from heavy external demand for roundwood. In 
addition to roundwood export tariffs the government plans to lower import tariffs for forest 
manufacturing technical equipment and to initiate co-operation projects between the 
government and foreign enterprises to strengthen the much needed infrastructure (Putin 2007). 
In another speech to Russian forestry companies Putin criticized other countries unwillingness 
to let Russian companies enter their markets and hence tried to justify Russia’s export taxes as 
a countermeasure to other countries’ barriers to trade (Roberts 2007). Putin’s speeches 
suggest that Russia will supervise its resources more closely in the future.  
 
Since the forest resources in Northwest-Russia are almost completely utilized, and the area is 
also home to further processing, the export taxes are likely aimed to affect the eastern part of 
Russia, with its vast underutilized forest resources, poor infrastructure, and geographic 
closeness to China. China’s demand is expected to rise, and Russia wants to take advantage of 
its position in relation to its largest buyer.  
 
One of the major reasons for export taxes may also be to deter illegal logging. Illegal loggings 
are a notable problem in Russia. There have been various estimates as to their effect, but 
various independent organizations (Greenpeace, WWF) have estimated illegal loggings to 
account for 20-30% of Russia’s fellings, though official numbers are much lower. Placing an 
export tax would make it more difficult to move across the border, while lowering its 
domestic market price would make it less profitable to log illegally. 
 
In November 2008 Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would 
postpone the third stage of roundwood export duties out of concern for their effects on 
Finnish employment. Mr. Putin’s explanations were widely regarded in Finland as an attempt 
to  garner  points  for  a  political  move  that  was  necessary  in  any  case.  Due  to  the  global  
financial crisis foreign investors have put new (and even existing) investments on indefinite 
hold. In this investment climate the tariff was unlikely to succeed in luring foreign investors 
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into Russia, one of the main reasons for its original implementation. The tariffs already 
imposed stay in place, and a later rising of the tariffs cannot yet be counted out. Mr. Putin has 
announced that Russia will continue to strive to develop domestic processing industry.  
 
6. The effects of export taxes on Russia 
 
Russia implemented the initial round of export tax increases in July 2007, adding a 20% (or 
minimum 10 euro) increase on spruce, pine, and over 15cm birch, and 10% (minimum 5 euro) 
tax  on  aspen.  The  effects  of  this  increased  tax  can  already  be  seen  in  the  trade  statistics  of  
2007 both as increased unit prices and reduced exports. Finnish forestry companies very 
quickly started to look for available wood sources elsewhere, mainly increasing domestic 
purchases. As the Finnish forestry market is quite developed, however, there was not much 
room for capacity increases.  
 
Between 2006 and 2007 the exports of coniferous and nonconiferous industrial roundwood 
both fell by approximately 3,5%, while the exports of sawnwood increased by 8,6%. The 
reduced export demand for roundwood benefitted Russian saws the most, as roundwood 
prices make up the bulk of their raw materials costs. By spring 2009 the roundwood export 
taxes have had a notable impact on the felling quantities in Russia. Finnish forest companies 
usually make advance payments for future wood deliveries in the previous summer, and wood 
is felled in the winter months. Because of the export taxes Finnish companies have refused to 
sign new contracts, so wood goes uncut in Russia. (Kyyrönen, 2009)  
 
The effects so far have been amplified by the global economic crisis, which has rapidly 
reduced demand for wood products, especially for construction purposes. Wood processors in 
Europe are reducing capacity, putting existing investments on hold, and are certainly not 
making any new investments in Russia or elsewhere. Before the financial crisis the Russian 
sawmilling industry experienced a brief period of rapid growth as its raw materials prices fell 
and demand remained high in the U.S. housing market. As the financial crisis gripped the U.S. 
and Russian loggings contracted rapidly, this benefit was also lost. 
 
Because of the roundwood export taxes, Exported Russian wood is currently somewhat more 
expensive than its Finnish counterpart. This has naturally made it economically unviable for 
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Finnish purchasers to buy Russian wood. Exports into China have not fallen quite as much as 
with Finland, partly because China subsidises the imports of roundwood through tax benefits. 
(Kyyrönen, 2009) 
 
In 2008 Turner et al. published a research paper Implications of the Russian roundwood 
export tax for the Russian and global wood products sectors.  In  it  they  utilized  the  Global  
Forest Products Model, an econometric model created to estimate global supply and demand 
ramifications for different kinds of wood products. According to their simulations, the 
softwood export tax would reduce Russian roundwood exports by 50% and roundwood prices 
in Russia by 16%, but increase the Russian domestic consumption of industrial roundwood by 
only 1,9%. Revenues from all Russian forest products exports, including roundwood would 
decrease by 23%, and the revenue of all Russian forest industries would decrease by 14%. 
The main reason for this rather pessimistic conclusion is that Russian manufacturing costs are 
relatively high, and the reduction in roundwood price would be insufficient to increase the 
wood manufacturing sector’s competitiveness. (Turner et al. 2007)  
 
In the spring of 2009 Russia was planning to remove roundwood export taxes from companies 
that invested into Russian production. This might lure new investments into the country, but it 
would also treat companies that have already invested in Russia quite unfairly. 
 
6.1 Similarities and differences with other cases of restrictions on 
raw materials exports 
 
There were two cases of previous raw materials export restrictions that were examined in this 
thesis. One was the export tax placed on cotton to support the yarn market in Pakistan, and the 
other was the trade liberalization of cashew nuts in Mozambique. There are similarities and 
differences between these two cases and the Russian export tax on roundwood, and those 
factors may be a determining force in how effective the Russian export restrictions will prove 
to be.  
 
The Pakistani export tax on cotton was primarily placed to develop the country’s yarn sector. 
While on the surface this policy worked, an econometric analysis on the effects carried out by 
Hudson and Ethridge (1999) showed that the additional positive effect the trade policy had on 
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the yarn sector was negligible, while its adverse effect on the cotton production was far more 
severe. There were two stated reasons for this: 
 
1. Demand for cotton in Pakistan was highly inelastic. 
2. A large portion of yarn production in Pakistan was exported, and yarn was a uniform good 
with a globalized market. 
 
We can now ask whether either of these two hold true for Russia. In the case of paper and 
pulp production, we can assume that his holds true to some extent. Investments into new 
production capacity are slow to take effect, and so it’s unlikely that their demand for logs will 
increase rapidly because of lower prices. The only place where this may happen is in North-
West Russia, where the domestic producers are genuinely competing for the same raw 
materials with western processors. There is no reliable information available on the capacity 
utilization level of current Russian pulp and paper mills, so it is possible that these mills may 
be able to increase production without new investment into infrastructure.  
 
The case may be somewhat different for sawmills, which require less of a capital investment 
to increase production. As mentioned before, they are the primary beneficiaries of low 
roundwood prices as raw materials prices constitute such a large part of their total costs. 
There has already been evidence of domestic roundwood demand increasing rapidly as saws 
take advantage of low log prices and the suddenly halted foreign demand for roundwood.  
 
The second reason why the Pakistani cotton export tax did not work was because a large 
portion of yarn production was exported. Figure 10 provides a view into the share of 
production that is exported for various important product categories. While the exports of 
roundwood in terms of quantity are far higher than with sawnwood, a larger portion of the 
production sawnwood and paper and paperboard are actually exported than is the case with 
roundwood. 
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Figure 10: Share of wood production exported 1992-2006 
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For sawnwood over 70% of production is exported, and even for paper this number is near 
40%. This means that all of Russia’s wood processing sectors are dependent on the world 
export markets. Furthermore items such as sawnwood, paper, and wood pulp are all rather 
uniform standardised products with fairly small regional differences. This leads to the 
conclusion that these processors may all benefit from the subsidy that an export tax on 
roundwood provides. It also means that this artificial benefit may, much like in Pakistan, 
hamper these industries from making cost-saving improvements in a very globally 
competitive industry.  
 
The case of cashew nuts in Mozambique was somewhat different in the sense that it studied 
the effects of trade liberalization, the effects of removing a trade barrier. Regardless of this, 
the case in question is insightful in examining the structure of the domestic industry and the 
global market for the product as the primary factors that determine the effects of trade policy. 
The major affecting factor in Mozambique was imperfect competition on both a local and a 
global scale. This manifested in two ways: 
1. The power-relation between raw materials producers, traders and processors. 
2. The global concentration of the raw-materials market compared to the processed goods 
market 
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According to Dudarev et al. (2004) in Northwest Russia the main elements of the forest 
cluster are forestry and harvesting, mechanical wood-processing, and pulp and paper. Forestry 
and harvesting companies make up a uniform high-density network of rather small companies 
with revenues of approximately 100 000$ per year. The mechanical wood-processing 
companies are generally also small with a local importance, and finally there are some large 
mechanical wood processing and pulp and paper companies that operate regionally or even 
nationally (through groups).  
 
According to a study done by CIBC in 2007 the five largest logging companies account for 
less than 10% of the total fellings in the country and the bulk of the harvesting is done by 
some 20 000 logging and harvesting enterprises. (CIBC 2007) 
 
In Russia there does not exist a national market for wood. The Northwest Russian forest 
cluster is the most developed part of the national industry; elsewhere undeveloped 
infrastructure means that markets are very much local. This does not provide forestry and 
harvesting companies with a high degree of market power either. This market power will be 
further diminished by the export taxes, as they are denied the possibility of exporting their 
products.  
 
The key question in comparing Russia and Mozambique is how much do Russian forestry and 
harvesting companies benefit from exporting roundwood? And would the Russian forest 
industry benefit from a better competitive situation if it graduated to products with a higher 
added value. This question may be partly answered by looking at the global concentration of 
import markets for different wood products. This can be done by utilizing measures 
commonly used to study industry concentration: the Concentration Ratio and the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index. The concentration ratio measures the market share of the m largest 
companies (or in this case, countries) in total wood imports. The Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
on the other hand sums up the squares of all the countries’ market shares in a particular 
industry. A higher Concentration Ratio or Herfindahl Hirschman Index implicates a higher 
concentration.   
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Table 8: The concentration of imports for different wood products (2006) 
 Industrial roundwood (total) 
Industrial 
roundwood (C) 
Industrial 
roundwood (NC) 
Paper and 
paperboard 
Wood 
pulp Sawnwood 
CR4 0,52 0,53 0,58 0,37 0,54 0,49 
HHI 1022 1004 1245 507 940 1164 
Source: Faostat  
 
From table 8 we can see that according to the Concentration Index the world import market is 
most concentrated for nonconiferous industrial roundwood, while the paper and paperboard 
market is the least concentrated. Results are similar with the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, 
with some notable exceptions. Sawnwood scores the second lowest concentration ratio but the 
second highest HHI, while wood pulp has the second lowest HHI but second highest 
concentration ratio. From this we can tentatively state that the Russian forest industry faces 
less concentrated demand were it to develop its exports mainly towards paper products. The 
development of exports toward sawnwood (as has mainly happened so far) and wood pulp 
may not benefit the country much in improving its market power.  
 
The concentration of demand is not the only determining factor in market attractiveness. 
While concentrated demand is an adverse feature to an exporter, concentrated supply is not. 
Russia can better utilize monopoly power in exporting products which have few suppliers, or 
a higher concentration of exports.  
 
Table 9: The concentration exports for different wood products (2006) 
 
Industrial 
roundwood (total) 
Industrial 
roundwood (C) 
Industrial 
roundwood (NC) 
Paper and 
paperboard 
Wood 
pulp Sawnwood 
CR4 0,56 0,66 0,49 0,42 0,57 0,56 
HHI 1664 2119 1167 644 1119 1177 
Source: Faostat 
 
The export concentration of different wood products points Russia towards another direction 
concerning the attractiveness of different wood products markets. The paper and paperboard 
international market, in addition to being the least concentrated in demand, is also the least 
concentrated when it comes to supply. The only product gategory where concentration is 
above a moderate level (1000-1800 according to the United States Department of Justice), is 
the exporting of coniferous roundwood, in which Russia held a 43% world market share in 
2006.  
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Looking purely at the supply side concentration it would seem beneficial for Russia to 
concentrate on coniferous roundwood, as it holds substantial market power in the exports of 
that good. Regardless of this, the supply side concentration should not be taken at face value. 
While industrial roundwood exports are concentrated around Russia and a few others, this 
may  not  be  so  much  a  reflection  of  their  market  power  or  comparative  advantage  as  it  is  a  
reflection of the unprofitability of roundwood exporting. Most developed countries utilize 
domestic wood production themselves, processing it into higher value-added products.  
 
6.2 The welfare effect of export taxes on Russia 
 
As  previously  discussed  in  the  theory  of  export  taxes  the  welfare  effect  of  an  export  tax  on  
Russia depends highly on the market power the country has in the world market for 
roundwood. As Russia is the world’s largest exporter of roundwood, with an estimated market 
share of over 40% in total world roundwood exports (2006), one can safely assume it to hold 
notable market power in the field.  
 
According to trade theory, a country can benefit from placing an export tax by improving its 
terms of trade. For this improvement to take place, however, that country has to be a “large” 
country, in that the demand that it faces for its products is elastic. In this very simplified 
framework it would seem after looking at the Russian forest industry and the market power it 
holds in roundwood, that Russia could certainly benefit from placing export taxes on the 
commodity. 
 
The basic expectation would be that the revenues the government collects from exported logs 
and the lower prices domestic consumers pay for their supplies more than make up for the 
producer surplus loss incurred by an export tax. This can only be true if the export tax placed 
is not prohibitive to trade. The final 80% export tax, which is currently placed on hold, may 
effectively end log exports from Russia. This would mean that the government would get no 
revenues, producers would lose the whole producer surplus, and domestic consumers would 
fully benefit from the increased domestic supply.  
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6.3 Optimal export tax for Russia 
 
The theory behind calculating an optimal export tax for a given good was examined in chapter 
3.3.  At its simplest form the optimal export is simply T* = ?1/da?, where da is the demand 
price elasticity for the country’s exported product. One way to calculate is is to find the price 
elasticity through econometric modelling: by estimating a demand function for the product. 
From this function we could utilize the parameter for demand price elasticity for roundwood. 
Unfortunately these estimated functions do not often yield particularly realistic parameters for 
demand because of the vast number of possible variables that are in reality involved. At its 
most basic level the aggregate demand for an export from a certain country can be expressed 
as: 
 
logXtd= a0 + a1log(PX/PXW)t + a2logYWt 
 
where Xd is the quality of exports demanded, PX is the price of exports, PXW is the weighted 
average of the export prices of the country’s trading partners, and YW is a weighed average of 
the  real  incomes  of  the  country’s  trading  partners.  By  estimating  the  parameters  of  this  
function, we can use a1 as the demand elasticity for the exported product.  
 
For coniferous roundwood, Russia’s main exported roundwood, the required data on trade 
flows can be found from Faostat. The real purchasing power parity incomes are derived from 
the IMF world economic outlook database. Faostat provides time series data for export values 
and quantities from 1993-2007, from which we can derive unit prices for different countries. 
In the case of export prices from trading partners we can use the previously calculated market 
shares of the largest of coniferous roundwood exporters: United States, Germany, New 
Zealand, Canada, Sweden, Czech Republic, France, and Latvia. These shares can then be used 
to weigh individual countries’ export unit prices to get yearly values for PXW.  
 
For the income level purchasing power parity GDP per capita was used for the world’s largest 
importers of coniferous roundwood: Austria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Japan, Korea, 
and Sweden. Each country’s GDP per capita was weighed with the respective market share to 
gain yearly values for YW. 
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Because the Faostat data is annual, there were only 15 observations, and hence the regression 
can hardly be considered reliable to any degree. It does, however, provide some estimates of 
the demand elasticity and the relative importance of different factors for wood demand. 
 
To further deepen the analysis, the regression takes into consideration the possibility of 
lagged variables affecting the relationship: mainly the possibility that it may be difficult for 
importers to find other trading partners despite growing Russian prices.  
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were also run on the variables, and it was found that the 
variable for Russian exports was non-stationary, as was its first differential. The second 
differential was stationary. The same applied to the demand variable. The relationship 
between  Russia’s  wood  prices  and  world  wood  prices,  however,  was  stationary  in  the  first  
differential. According to the Engle-Granger method of testing co-integration Russia’s 
exports of coniferous roundwood are also cointegrated with both the export price, and the 
demand variable. Because of the low number of observations, however, only three regressions 
were run: one for the initial demand function, one which takes into account lagged exports, 
and one function which calculates both their differential regression, and the long run balance. 
This last equation regresses the first differentials and uses a linear combination of the (lagged) 
variables as an error correction term. It can be presented as:  
 
dlogXtd=  a0 +  a1dlog(PX/PXW)t +  a2dlogYWt +  a3log(PW/PWX)t-1 +  a4log(YW)t-1 + 
a5log(X)t-1 
 
Regressing this equation provides us with the short run demand elasticity a1 and by setting the 
differentials to zero (no change), we can also calculate the long run demand elasticity a3/-a5.  
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The findings are presented below: 
 
Table 10: Correlates of Russia’s coniferous roundwood exports 
 lnX dlnX 
Constant 19,74 -11,07 -7,69 
    
lnPX/PXW 2,32 0,11  
    
lnYW -0,22 1,43  
    
lnX(t-1)  0,81 -0,31 
  3,25*  
lnPX/PXW(t-1)  0,49 
    
lnYW(t-1)   1,33 
    
dlnPW/PW  -0,75 
    
dlnYW   0,1 
    
Observations 15 14 14 
R-squared 0,72 0,8941 0,69 
*statistically significant at 5 %  
 
 
While none of the regressions provide us with a statistically significant finding of the demand 
elasticity for coniferous roundwood, the final equation atleast provides us with a negative 
short term price elasticity (-0,75) and a long term price elasticity of 1,58 (0,49/0,31). This 
would give us a short-term optimal export tax of 133%, and the long term optimal export tax 
cannot be calculated, as the price elasticity of demand is supposedly still positive. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, neither of these findings are statistically significant.  
 
Another way to derive the optimal export tax is by further looking into the determinants of the 
demand elasticity for the country’s product. The basic idea behind setting an optimal export 
tax was, that by utilizing its market power and the (in)elasticities of global demand and supply 
a country could raise its own welfare by setting an export tax. The actual formula for 
calculating the optimal export tax is 
 
T* = a/?d – s0 (1-a)? 
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Where a is the country’s share in world markets, d is the aggregate price elasticity of demand 
for the product, and s0 is the price elasticity of supply for the rest of the world. The problem 
with calculating an optimal export tax for roundwood for Russia is that no calculations have 
really been made on the price elasticities of supply and demand in roundwood trade. While 
the lack of reliable global-level data hinders the precision of results presented here, we can 
utilize research on local supply and demand elasticities, and on the global market of other 
roundwood products and draw some conclusions from them.  
 
The earliest econometric modelling on the Finnish roundwood market was performed by Jari 
Kuuluvainen in 1986 with his paper An econometric analysis of the sawlog market in Finland. 
The next step, applying modern time series analysis to the Finnish market, was taken by 
Hetemäki and Kuuluvainen, who study price elasticities in roundwood supply and demand in 
Finland in their 1992 paper Incorporating Data and Theory in Roundwood Supply and 
Demand Estimation. In their study they construct an econometric model of the timber market 
by examining private nonindustrial timber supply with a three-input demand function (capital, 
labor, wood). In their research they determine short and long term price elasticities based on 
stumpage prices for both supply and demand. Anne Toppinen took this further in 1998 with 
her paper Roundwood market integration in Finland: a multivariate cointegration analysis, 
where she utilized monthly data and applied more recent developments in econometric 
modelling.  
 
Table 11: Supply and demand elasticity of the Finnish saw-log market in selected studies 
  
Study 
Short-term Long-term 
Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Kuuluvainen (1986) 3,1 -0,9  
Hetemäki & Kuuluvainen (1992) 0,81 0,14* -0,27 -1,03 
Toppinen (1998) 1,6 -1,5  
*not significant 
 
The Finnish results can provide us with some information about the level elasticity, but the 
Finnish market is also hardly representative of world markets, and hence global level 
elasticities need to be looked at. 
 
The Global Forest Products Model developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) attempts to map trade flows, supply and demand, and input-output 
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relations  of  forest  products  globally.  In  the  model  the  supply  elasticity  for  industrial  
roundwood (sawlogs and pulpwood) is represented with an econometric equation and and the 
demand elasticity is represented with input-output coefficients.  
 
The supply elasticity for industrial roundwood is a function of the price of industrial 
roundwood,  and  it  is  assumed to  be  0,8  for  all  countries  expect  for  Asia,  where  it  varies  by  
country. In the GFPM the demand for sawlogs and pulpwood is described by input-output 
coefficients (sawlogs/pulpwood input per unit of sawnwood, panels and pulp production), and 
the attendant manufacturing costs, so the elasticity of demand for sawlogs and pulpwood with 
respect to price is implicit and no set values exist.  
 
Although the model treats sawlogs and pulpwood, as implicit, it calculates explicit world 
demand elasticities for a variety of other wood products.  
 
Table 12: Price elasticity of demand for forest products (GFPM) 
Product Short-term Long-term 
Fuelwood -0.03 -0.08 
Sawnwood -0.08 -0.23 
Veneer and Plywood -0.11 -0.16 
Particle Board -0.06 -0.10 
Fibreboard -0.10 -0.29 
Other Industrial Roundwood -0.06 -0.17 
Newsprint -0.16 -0.32 
Printing and Writing Paper -0.30 -0.70 
Other Paper and Paperboard -0.23 -0.35 
Source: GFPM 
 
The problem then becomes: how to determine the global demand price elasticity for industrial 
roundwood? As no set values for this exist, and as the models made of the Finnish roundwood 
market are hardly representative of the whole world, it is best to calculate a few alternate 
scenarios,  assuming  that  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  roundwood  is  somewhere  near  the  
elasticity of other forest product raw materials/intermediate products, such as sawnwood, 
plywood, and other industrial roundwood. This would mean that in the short term the demand 
elasticity is very low, varying between -0,06 and -0,11, and the long term elasticity would be 
placed between -0,10 and  -0,29.  
 
Unfortunately no differentiation exists between the demand elasticity for coniferous and 
nonconiferous wood, though the global market for these two differs somewhat, and may differ 
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particularly strongly in Russia’s case. While Russia exports coniferous wood fairly evenly to 
several large importers, its exports of nonconiferous wood are more concentrated, with 
Finland accounting for 80% of imports. This suggests monopsony power and a higher 
elasticity of demand for nonconiferous roundwood. In this analysis I will treat the demand 
elasticity for both products as equal.  
    
Determining Russia’s market share in world roundwood exports is somewhat easier, and can 
be done by looking at Comtrade or Faostat data. For calculating the optimal export tax I 
choose to use the Faostat data, as it is more conveniently arranged into a roundwood product 
group. 
 
Figure 11: Russian Federation industrial roundwood exports 1992-2007 (CUM) and 
Russia's share of the world market 
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Source: FAOSTAT 
 
As can be seen, Russia’s share in world exports of industrial roundwood has increased 
notably since the mid 90’s, particularly for coniferous roundwood. In 2006 the share in world 
exports was at 43% for coniferous and 42% for nonconiferous roundwood exports. With these 
parameters we can calculate an estimate for the theoretically optimal export tax that would 
maximize Russia’s welfare utilizing its market power in roundwood. To reiterate: we consider 
Russia’s share of world markets to be its 2006 share of 43% for coniferous industrial 
roundwood, 42% for nonconiferous industrial roundwood, the elasticity of supply for the rest 
of the world’s roundwood production to be 0,8, and the long term price elasticity of world 
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demand to be between -0,10 and -0,29. By calculating for an optimal export tax with these 
values we get the following figure.  
 
Figure 12: Optimal export tax for industrial roundwood with different demand price 
elasticities 
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Naturally as the price elasticity of demand increases, the optimal export tax becomes lower. 
Figure 9 provides us with the relative export tax based on Russia’s 2006 market share. This 
export tax is calculated with the long term demand elasticity. Considering these numbers, it 
seems that the short term optimal export tax we received from calculating the demand 
function (133%) may not be as unreasonable as it first seems. 
 
In 2006 the export price of coniferous industrial roundwood from Russia was 69,37 
USD/CUM, and the export price of non-coniferous industrial roundwood was 50,25 
USD/CUM. The implemented Russian export taxes (as seen in Table 7) are denominated both 
as percentages and as minimum Euro values. The first export taxes, implemented 01.07.2007, 
called for a 20% export tax (min 10 Euros) on spruce, pine, and over 15 cm birch (the main 
non-coniferous tree-export from Russia), and a 10% export tax (min 5 Euros) on aspen. The 
final (for now postponed) export tax increase called for an 80% export tax (min 50 euros) on 
spruce, pine, aspen and birch. There had been a clear upward trend in the prices of both 
coniferous and non-coniferous roundwood exports from Russia already for some years, but it 
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seems clear that the 80% tax increase is hardly welfare improving even if we were to assume 
extremely inelastic world demand.  
 
6.4 Tariff jumping and the effects of export taxes on the Russian 
forest industry  
 
Chapter 3,4 touched upon theories that relate trade policy to industrial structure and introduce 
the idea of tariff jumping. The idea that by placing restrictions on trade a country can have an 
effect on the movement of production factors (capital, labour) and the idea that through the 
same operation a country can change the industrial structure of both countries resonates 
strongly with the case of Russia. In principle the placement of prohibitive export taxes should 
move labour or capital into Russia, and in principle placing export restrictions on roundwood 
should motivate companies to place processing facilities in Russia instead of just exporting. 
The problem with this reasoning is that there is a wide array of additional costs involved in 
investing into Russia, and it may be that not even a prohibitive export tax would make up for 
those costs.  
 
The industrial structure examination of Horstman and Markusen (1990) manipulated firm 
specific  costs,  plant  specific  costs,  and  tariff  and  transportation  costs  to  find  optimal  Nash  
equilibrium outcomes of different investment scenarios. While in principle the raised tariff 
costs could cause a new industrial equilibrium (one where firms produce in Russia instead of 
importing from there), it may also be that the plant specific costs remain too high in Russia to 
warrant investment even with barriers to trade. This possibility is supported by Finnish 
companies’ experiences in Russia: recently Ruukki Group lost a 40 billion Rouble greenfield 
investment into a pulp mill because the local administration changed. While the raised tariffs 
shift equilibrium towards investing into Russia, this may not happen unless other variables are 
simultaneously changed.  
 
The consequences of export taxes were earlier divided into welfare effects, and distributional 
effects. While welfare effects deal with the terms of trade and efficiency, distributional effects 
have to do with income distribution among different factors of production. In addition to 
hurting or aiding Russia as a country, roundwood export taxes are bound to have different 
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kinds  of  effects  on  different  sectors  of  the  economy,  and  more  specifically  on  the  different  
subsectors of the Russian forest industry. 
 
The main stated purpose of the roundwood export tax was to encourage industrial 
restructuring from products with low added value toward products with higher added value. In 
effect this meant moving production units (labour, capital) from logging and harvesting 
operations to pulp, paper, and other more advanced production sectors.  
 
With this stated goal in mind it is obvious that the logging and harvesting sector will bear the 
brunt of the losses incurred by the trade policy. With the drop in export demand and crowding 
in domestic supply this sector will have to contract substantially. This is particularly worrying 
in Russia’s case, since this sector is the most labour intensive in forest products. The proposed 
export taxes are likely to increase unemployment dramatically in areas that concentrate 
extensively on harvesting and logging. In addition to this, because of the high number and 
low concentration of harvesting and logging companies this sector was not particularly 
profitable in the first place. 
 
The Russian producers that will benefit the most from the increased export taxes are those 
producing plywood, lumber, and to a lesser extent, pulp. The reason for this is that logs 
typically make up 65-75% of the variable costs of producing lumber, 65% of the variable 
costs for plywood, and 45-55% of the variable costs for market pulp. (CIBC 2007) Because of 
the increased domestic supply of roundwood these industries benefit from lower raw material 
costs. This may also increase their export competitiveness.  
 
According to a UNECE/Fao Forest Products Annual Market Review, the Russian sawmilling 
industry has been adapting to increases in the log export tax schedule that supports more 
processing in Russia. A significant number of new sawmill investments were announced 
throughout 2007 and into the first half of 2008. (Unece/FAO, 2008) 
 
The Russian forest sector can be called dilapidated. Average equipment is around 25 years old 
and the majority is depreciated by 80% (Expert, 2004). Since current Russian pulp and paper 
mills are already operating at or near full capacity, to increase production external 
investments are required. While investment into the industry is desperately required, the 
applied export tax on roundwood does little to deal with the fundamental problems holding 
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back foreign investment: underdeveloped infrastructure and an inadequate system of 
governance.  
 
Because of the Russian government’s recent active role in certain industries it is also possible 
that the government plans to take a more active role in the forest sector as well. The creation 
of a national champion, a paper producer with notable domestic monopoly power may well be 
in the government’s plans 
 
6.5 Russian export taxes from a strategic trade policy perspective 
 
The Russian export taxes may also provide us with an interesting example on the effects 
imperfect competition on trade policy. The structure of the Russian forest industry has been a 
focusing point in this thesis, and is extremely relevant when looking at strategic trade policy. 
In addition to domestic industry structure, another important aspect is the structure of the 
global demand. 
 
According to Helpman and Krugman’s Trade Policy and Market Structure (1989) a 
government can with an export tax “monopolize” an otherwise perfectly competitive (or 
oligopolistic) industry. The details of this process can be found in Chapter 3.4, but the basic 
premise is that facing a lower profit through lower marginal revenue companies will cut down 
on production and hence drive up prices. In this way it would make sense for the government 
to tax the exports of roundwood, at least as long as it’s facing perfect competition from 
abroad.  
 
Whether this makes sense for roundwood production is a difficult question to answer. On one 
hand the industry within Russia is very fragmented, and is hence producing a surplus 
compared to the optimal social surplus maximizing amount. On the other hand the initial 
model was such that there was no domestic consumption of roundwood. This does not apply 
to the case at hand, since roundwood is certainly also a domestically consumed product, and 
the whole point of the export taxes is to ensure domestic processors their raw materials. For 
this reason reducing roundwood supply through an export tax seems somewhat 
counterintuitive.  
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Another matter is the taxing of roundwood from the perspective of limited resources. A 
particularly interesting example is where we separate the producers of pulp and paper from 
the producers of roundwood for exports. Roundwood exports compete for some of the same 
resources as pulp and paper production, the roundwood harvested by the logging companies. 
This reminds us of the issue presented in Figure 3, presented here for the second time.  
 
Figure 13: Roundwood exports versus pulp and paper production 
 
 
Let  us  consider  a  model  of  two  industries  and  one  good.  That  good  is  wood,  and  the  two  
industries are the exporting of roundwood (X1), and the production of pulp and paper (X2). 
Both industries compete for a single, limited resource: felled wood. I have modelled here 
roundwood exporting to be a more perfectly competitive industry, with perceived marginal 
revenue (MR’ far above true marginal revenue and hence close to world demand), and the 
pulp and paper industry to be a more concentrated industry, with perceived marginal revenue 
to be lower, closer to true marginal revenue. In this case in principle both industries might be 
eligible for export tariffs, since both are currently producing more than they should, but were 
both to maximize profits based on true marginal revenue instead of perceived marginal 
revenue, resource distribution should move from E1 to E2, meaning the roundwood exporting 
industry should utilize less of the wood resources, and the pulp and paper industry more.  
 
This example is somewhat questionable, since the foreign demand elasticity differs strongly 
for different wood products. While the pulp and paper industry is probably more concentrated 
than roundwood exporting in Russia, it’s quite possible that worldwide Russia can collect 
relatively more producer surplus from roundwood exports where it has more market power.  
MR1 
MR’1 
MR’2 
MR2 
X1 X2 
S 
E1 
E2 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Russia’s forest industry has had an influence on its Finnish counterpart ever since one became 
separate from the other. The vast forest resources, close knit trade relations, and varying 
economic and political systems of our neighbour have had a profound impact on the 
development of the Finnish forest industry as well. As a trade partner and a competitor, the 
Russian forest industry has become a source of raw materials, but also a destination for 
investments. Hence its development is important to Finland. 
 
Both competitiveness and trade policy are widely researched subjects with established 
methods and a theory base to build on. This makes it possible to study the Russian forest 
industry and the trade policy implications of an export tax together to form a more complete 
picture of the effects of the export tax. Historically export taxes have not been a very 
successful policy instrument, but Russia’s case has several factors which make it a unique 
proponent of the trade policy.  
 
Compared to its Finnish counterpart, the Russian forest industry is inefficient and focused on 
products with a low added value. Compared to other countries in similar stages of economic 
development, Russia is pretty much on par. In terms of resources the country has enormous 
potential in the field of forest products, but insufficient infrastructure, troublesome legislation, 
and a lack of capital investments are holding back development. Capacity in pulp and paper 
mills is mostly utilized, so in the short term increased supply of roundwood is unlikely to 
boost production. 
 
As a large country Russia would probably benefit from the terms of trade effect of a correctly 
priced roundwood export tax. As its current tax policy aims to be prohibitive to roundwood 
trade,  this  terms  of  trade  effect  is  not  quite  as  relevant  as  the  income distribution  effect  and  
the structural transformation the tax will likely cause. The structural transformation may be 
achieved by raising barriers to trade and hence encouraging factor movements, but it may be 
that this is not sufficient to make investing into wood processing in Russia profitable. The 
main beneficiaries from the export tax are those domestic industries where roundwood prices 
account for notable share of the final cost. Those industries are plywood, lumber, and pulp. 
The main sufferer is the logging and harvesting industry, which is already rather unprofitable.  
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Perhaps the most important variable in determining the industry effects of the trade policy is 
the industry concentration and structure, both in Russia and abroad. Russia has significant 
market power as an exporter of roundwood, a benefit it would lose were it to move to more 
sophisticated products. On the other hand importers of Russian forest products would also 
lose some of their monopsony power. 
 
The export tax Russia is imposing is unlikely to have the intended effects. The original idea 
was to force foreign investors to invest in production within the country, instead of 
transporting raw materials out. The export tax does not change any of the factors that have 
made the situation as it is in the first place. Transporting roundwood long distances is a 
relatively unprofitable enterprise due to the low value/weight ratio of the product. It is in the 
interests of forest producers to have further processing as near as possible to the raw material 
base. This means that there are heavy reasons outside of foreign protectionism why forest 
industry investors are not investing in Russia. Erratic industrial policy, which includes raised 
tariffs, occasional industrial nationalization, and a rift between territorial and federal politics, 
is unlikely to improve the situation. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Product level PRODY, prody, and Russia’s RCA values 
 
Number Commodity PRODY prody RCA (Russia) 
440110 Fuel wood, in logs, in billets... o 11504,96 10,63 0,74 
440121 Coniferous wood in chips or particl 20381,93 10,61 2,09 
440122 Non-coniferous wood in chips or par 13288,85 10,53 0,08 
440130 Sawdust, wood waste and scrap (incl 18809,26 10,52 0,99 
440200 Wood charcoal 5179,33 10,40 0,17 
440310 Wood in the rough..., treated with  8663,28 10,35 0,37 
440320 Untreated coniferous wood in the ro 16171,09 10,31 14,67 
440331 Dark Red Meranti, Light Red Meranti 8042,01 10,29 0,00 
440333 Keruing, Ramin, Kapur, Teak, Jongko 9036,15 10,27 0,00 
440391 Oak (Quercus spp.) wood in the roug 16266,42 10,26 6,01 
440392 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood in the roug 14443,63 10,19 0,22 
440399 Wood, nes in the rough..., (excl. t 9769,98 10,16 9,83 
440410 Coniferous hoopwood; split poles, e 9683,35 10,14 0,29 
440420 Non-coniferous hoopwood; split pole 5768,30 10,13 0,01 
440500 Wood wool; wood flour 2039,26 10,13 0,89 
440610 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross- 9878,91 10,09 5,05 
440690 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross- 7247,74 10,07 4,20 
440710 Coniferous wood sawn or chipped len 15936,55 10,04 3,25 
440721 Specified tropical woods (Meranti,  11489,83 10,03 0,00 
440722 Specified tropical woods (OKoume... 6361,09 10,03 0,00 
440723 Baboen, Mahogany, Imbuia and Balsa  5514,46 10,01 0,00 
440791 Oak (Quercus spp.) wood,sawn/chippe 14049,96 10,00 0,47 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood,sawn/chippe 7746,94 9,99 0,23 
440799 Wood, nes sawn or chipped lengthwis 7051,79 9,99 0,37 
440810 Coniferous veneer sheets and sheets 11799,60 9,97 0,04 
440820 Specified tropical wood veneer shee 6488,71 9,97 0,00 
440890 Veneer sheets and sheets for plywoo 11241,10 9,96 0,20 
440910 Coniferous wood, continuously shape 17552,74 9,95 0,35 
440920 Non-coniferous wood, continuously s 17391,13 9,93 0,12 
441010 Particle board and similar board of 20791,62 9,92 0,30 
441090 Particle board and similar board of 29852,44 9,91 0,00 
441111 Fibreboard of a density >0.8g/cm3,  11570,69 9,89 3,28 
441119 Fibreboard of a density >0.8g/cm3,  28734,39 9,89 0,27 
441121 Fibreboard of a density >0.5g/cm3 b 17796,76 9,88 0,03 
441129 Fibreboard of a density >0.5g/cm3 b 20454,32 9,88 0,12 
441131 Fibreboard of a density >0.35g/cm3  17386,49 9,87 0,00 
441139 Fibreboard of a density >0.35g/cm3  55237,72 9,87 0,01 
441191 Fibreboard of a density =<0.35g/cm3 21466,06 9,86 0,03 
441199 Fibreboard of a density =<0.35g/cm3 16911,12 9,84 0,02 
441211 Plywood with >=1 outer ply of tropi 8949,26 9,82 0,00 
441212 Plywood with >=1 outer ply of non-c 13110,37 9,79 4,98 
441219 Plywood, each ply =<6mm thick, nes 6331,08 9,78 0,47 
441221 Plywood... >6mm non-coniferous oute 8375,58 9,77 0,01 
441229 Plywood... >6mm non-coniferous oute 11994,64 9,76 0,01 
74 
 
441291 Plywood... containing at  least one 4738,85 9,76 0,02 
441299 Plywood, veneered panels and simila 8182,00 9,75 0,01 
441300 Densified wood, in blocks, plates,  7185,73 9,75 0,02 
441400 Wooden frames for paintings, photog 10264,59 9,74 0,00 
441510 Cases, boxes, crates, drums and sim 18410,64 9,74 0,06 
441520 Pallets, box pallets and other load 15498,07 9,74 0,11 
441600 Casks, barrets, vats, tubs, etc, an 21857,73 9,73 0,09 
441700 Tools..., broom or brush bodies...  9389,22 9,72 0,11 
441810 Windows, French-windows and their f 18500,80 9,71 0,08 
441820 Doors and their frames and threshol 11297,89 9,70 0,37 
441830 Parquet panels, of wood 21620,38 9,70 0,04 
441840 Shuttering for concrete constructio 10673,60 9,67 0,03 
441850 Shingles and shakes, of wood 10637,66 9,66 0,13 
441890 Builders' joinery and carpentry, of 13179,82 9,65 0,29 
441900 Tableware and kitchenware, of wood 4733,78 9,65 0,21 
442010 Statuettes and other ornaments, of  3778,27 9,65 1,53 
442090 Wood marquetry, inlaid wood; casket 11595,90 9,64 0,02 
442110 Clothes hangers of wood 12998,75 9,64 0,00 
442190 Articles of wood, nes 12320,61 9,64 0,36 
450110 Natural cork, raw or simply prepare 15898,54 9,61 0,00 
450190 Waste cork; crushed, granulated or  8617,24 9,60 0,00 
450200 Natural cork, debacked or roughly s 18757,07 9,60 0,00 
450310 Corks and stoppers of natural cork 10628,79 9,60 0,01 
450390 Articles of natural cork, nes 6858,44 9,60 0,00 
450410 Blocks..., tiles of any shape, soli 12346,32 9,60 0,00 
450490 Agglomerated cork; articles of aggl 13840,09 9,59 0,00 
470100 Mechanical wood pulp 32067,55 9,59 0,00 
470200 Chemical wood pulp, dissolving grad 21746,51 9,58 1,96 
470311 Unbleached coniferous chemical wood 17814,16 9,56 8,29 
470319 Unbleached non-coniferous chemical  21076,25 9,55 0,00 
470321 Semi-bleached or bleached coniferou 24903,62 9,55 0,98 
470329 Semi- or bleached non-coniferous ch 12431,79 9,54 1,04 
470411 Unbleached coniferous chemical wood 23696,64 9,54 13,29 
470419 Unbleached non-coniferous chemical  24655,75 9,52 0,00 
470421 Semi-bleached or bleached coniferou 27678,09 9,52 2,32 
470429 Semi- or bleached non-coniferous ch 24864,94 9,51 0,00 
470500 Semi-chemical wood pulp 31788,73 9,51 0,00 
470610 Cotton linters pulp 20895,12 9,50 0,20 
470691 Mechanical pulp of fibrous cellulos 23815,82 9,50 0,00 
470692 Chemical pulp of fibrous cellulosic 6724,95 9,50 0,00 
470693 Semi-chemical pulp of fibrous cellu 11955,53 9,47 0,01 
470710 Waste and scrap of unbleached kraft 19658,74 9,45 0,11 
470720 Waste and scrap of other paper or p 15713,66 9,44 0,02 
470730 Waste and scrap of paper or paperbo 21429,67 9,43 0,16 
470790 Waste and scrap of paper or paperbo 17795,18 9,43 0,07 
480100 Newsprint, in rolls or sheets 22828,34 9,41 2,21 
480210 Hand-made paper and paperboard 58385,32 9,41 0,00 
480220 Paper and paperboard as a base for  23246,65 9,40 0,00 
480230 Carbonizing base paper, uncoated, i 19380,60 9,38 0,02 
480240 Wallpaper base, uncoated, in rolls  25215,05 9,37 2,84 
480251 Paper... (excl. mechanical fibres), 13072,58 9,37 0,37 
480252 Paper... (excl. mechanical fibres), 17442,77 9,36 0,66 
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480253 Paper... (excl. mechanical fibres), 37102,59 9,34 0,08 
480260 Paper... (>10% of mechanical fibres 38221,18 9,34 0,03 
480300 Toilet... similar paper, in rolls o 18139,56 9,33 0,02 
480411 Unbleached kraftliner, uncoated, in 18811,19 9,33 1,21 
480419 Kraftliner, uncoated (excl. unbleac 17582,96 9,32 0,87 
480421 Unbleached sack kraft paper, uncoat 10838,50 9,31 3,62 
480429 Sack kraft paper (excl. unbleached) 20423,37 9,31 0,00 
480431 Unbleached kraft paper..., weighing 26658,24 9,31 0,32 
480439 Kraft paper... (excl. unbleached),  27444,28 9,29 0,01 
480441 Unbleached kraft paper..., weighing 19727,37 9,28 0,00 
480442 Kraft paper..., weighing >150g/m2 b 26318,39 9,27 0,00 
480449 Kraft paper..., weighing >150g/m2 b 17048,13 9,27 0,00 
480451 Unbleached kraft paper..., weighing 18139,07 9,27 0,05 
480452 Kraft paper..., weighing >=225g/m2, 33004,48 9,27 0,00 
480459 Kraft paper..., weighing >=225g/m2, 10279,15 9,25 0,03 
480510 Semi-chemical fluting paper (corrug 16365,45 9,25 0,02 
480521 Multi-ply paper and paperboard with 3890,30 9,25 0,00 
480522 Multi-ply paper... with only one ou 6247,71 9,24 0,00 
480523 Multi-ply paper... two outer layers 5093,60 9,24 0,00 
480529 Multi-ply paper and paperboard, in  14085,71 9,23 0,20 
480530 Sulphite wrapping paper, in rolls o 13157,89 9,21 0,21 
480540 Filter paper and paperboard, in rol 22821,27 9,20 0,02 
480550 Felt paper and paperboard, in rolls 13662,03 9,20 0,11 
480560 Paper and paperboard, in rolls or s 14185,72 9,20 0,65 
480570 Paper..., in rolls or sheets, weigh 18641,43 9,19 0,85 
480580 Paper and paperboard, in rolls or s 25121,91 9,18 0,13 
480610 Vegetable parchment, in rolls or sh 20304,74 9,17 2,65 
480620 Greaseproof papers, in rolls or she 29546,40 9,17 0,57 
480630 Tracing papers, in rolls or sheets 27504,41 9,16 0,26 
480640 Glassine and other glazed transpare 28707,62 9,15 0,12 
480710 Composite paper..., laminated with  4536,15 9,11 0,00 
480791 Straw paper and paperboard, in roll 5093,60 9,11 0,00 
480799 Composite paper and paperboard, in  22563,43 9,09 0,08 
480810 Corrugated paper and paperboard, in 10583,26 9,09 0,11 
480820 Sack kraft paper, creped or crinkle 13243,34 9,06 0,00 
480830 Kraft paper, creped or crinkled, (e 44583,60 9,05 0,00 
480890 Paper and paperboard, corrugated, c 11715,47 9,05 0,01 
480910 Carbon or similar copying papers, i 19303,00 9,05 0,00 
480920 Self-copy paper, in rolls or sheets 21684,19 9,05 0,00 
480990 Copying or transfer papers, nes, in 19701,64 9,05 0,00 
481011 Paper..., coated with kaolin, etc,  26537,66 9,05 0,00 
481012 Paper..., coated with kaolin, etc,  5105,97 9,04 0,00 
481021 Light-weight coated paper for writi 32794,27 9,03 0,00 
481029 Paper... for writing, etc, >10% mec 28259,61 9,03 0,00 
481031 Kraft paper..., bleached, >95% chem 35124,72 9,02 0,00 
481032 Kraft paper..., bleached, >95% chem 29859,17 9,01 0,00 
481039 Kraft paper and paperboard, coated. 29061,36 9,01 0,00 
481091 Multi-ply paper and paperboard, coa 25909,90 9,01 0,11 
481099 Paper and paperboard, coated with k 15917,46 9,01 0,01 
481110 Tarred, bituminized or asphalted pa 20989,55 8,99 0,06 
481121 Self-adhesive paper and paperboard 51611,31 8,99 0,00 
481129 Gummed paper and paperboard (excl.  12968,56 8,98 0,02 
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481131 Paper..., coated... with plastics,  34246,53 8,98 0,07 
481139 Paper and paperboard coated... with 20133,20 8,98 0,17 
481140 Paper and paperboard coated... with 22360,97 8,96 0,15 
481190 Paper, paperboard, coated... surfac 26341,54 8,94 0,02 
481200 Filter blocks, slabs and plates, of 22536,59 8,92 0,02 
481310 Cigarette paper in the form of book 24662,37 8,91 0,00 
481320 Cigarette paper in rolls of a width 12277,97 8,90 0,03 
481390 Cigarette paper, nes 12848,98 8,90 0,07 
481410 Ingrain paper 13015,36 8,87 0,26 
481420 Wallpaper, etc, of paper coated wit 11872,86 8,87 0,43 
481430 Wallpaper, etc, consisting of paper 29177,66 8,86 0,00 
481490 Wallpaper and other wall coverings; 12515,95 8,84 0,32 
481500 Floor coverings on a base of paper  6872,02 8,83 0,00 
481610 Carbon or similar copying papers 12409,80 8,83 0,01 
481620 Self-copy paper 24834,16 8,82 0,00 
481630 Duplicator stencils of paper 10759,15 8,82 0,00 
481690 Copying or transfer paper, nes; off 24073,50 8,82 0,00 
481710 Envelopes of paper or paperboard 20967,26 8,81 0,01 
481720 Letter cards, plain postcards and c 17142,16 8,81 0,00 
481730 Boxes, etc, of paper or paperboard  28700,25 8,80 0,03 
481810 Toilet paper 10421,66 8,78 0,08 
481820 Handkerchiefs and cleansing or faci 22641,24 8,76 0,01 
481830 Tablecloths and serviettes of paper 12020,25 8,76 0,05 
481840 Sanitary towels and tampons, napkin 14723,77 8,75 0,05 
481850 Articles of apparel and clothing of 13126,03 8,74 0,01 
481890 Household, sanitary or hospital art 20867,82 8,73 0,05 
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrug 12761,60 8,72 0,04 
481920 Folding cartons, boxes and cases, o 12084,29 8,69 0,08 
481940 Sacks and bags, including cones of  12446,99 8,69 0,01 
481950 Packing containers, including recor 20098,44 8,65 0,02 
481960 Box files, letter trays, storage bo 17645,64 8,65 0,00 
482010 Registers, account books, order and 6225,78 8,61 0,05 
482020 Exercise-books 4960,30 8,60 0,93 
482030 Binders (other than book covers), f 14517,06 8,58 0,06 
482040 Manifold business forms and interle 15045,85 8,57 0,04 
482050 Albums for stamps or for collection 12812,46 8,56 0,01 
482090 Blotting pads, book covers and othe 10534,53 8,54 0,12 
482110 Printed paper or paperboard labels  17430,73 8,54 0,06 
482190 Paper or paperboard labels of all k 17699,15 8,54 0,00 
482210 Bobbins, spools..., of paper or pap 21970,35 8,51 0,04 
482290 Bobbins, spools, cops and similar s 30715,97 8,51 0,06 
482311 Self-adhesive paper, in strips or r 21250,56 8,51 0,01 
482319 Gummed or adhesive paper (excl. sel 23526,64 8,50 0,00 
482320 Filter paper and paperboard, cut to 20742,96 8,47 0,06 
482340 Rolls, sheets and dials, printed fo 21799,13 8,46 0,15 
482351 Printed, embossed or perforated pap 6204,72 8,43 0,00 
482359 Paper and paperboard writing, print 5120,78 8,38 0,00 
482360 Trays, dishes, plates and cups, etc 14532,92 8,34 0,07 
482370 Moulded or pressed articles of pape 16787,54 8,32 0,05 
482390 Paper and paperboard, cut to size a 14331,65 8,32 0,08 
490110 Printed books, brochures, leaflets, 15084,93 8,31 0,14 
490191 Dictionaries and encyclopaedias, an 23812,42 8,26 0,58 
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490199 Printed books, brochures, leaflets  20147,09 8,25 0,47 
490210 Newspapers, journals and periodical 14564,06 8,20 0,04 
490290 Newspapers, journals and periodical 23063,24 8,18 0,54 
490300 Children's picture, drawing or colo 24360,13 8,17 0,04 
490400 Music, printed or in manuscript 9869,97 8,12 0,00 
490591 Maps and hydrographic or similar ch 12864,70 8,09 0,10 
490599 Maps and hydrographic or similar ch 13098,98 8,06 0,25 
490600 Plans... for architectural... purpo 14762,64 8,03 0,38 
490700 New stamps; stamp-impressed paper;  9837,84 8,03 0,17 
490810 Transfers (decalcomanias), vitrifia 27825,32 8,01 0,00 
490890 Transfers (decalcomanias) (excl. vi 28034,61 8,00 0,01 
490900 Printed or illustrated postcards; p 11005,21 7,93 0,10 
491000 Calendars of any kind, printed, inc 15122,23 7,88 1,39 
491110 Trade advertising material, commerc 21417,77 7,65 0,01 
491191 Pictures, designs and photographs 9821,40 7,41 0,52 
491199 Other printed matter, nes 12165,53 7,23 0,31 
 
 
Appendix 2: Countries EXPY and expy values 
 
 Country EXPY  Country expy 
1 Luxembourg 35281,38 1 Luxembourg 21367,22 
2 Qatar 31195,68 2 Finland 16859,72 
3 Norway 24859,95 3 Qatar 16334,92 
4 Finland 24117,33 4 Norway 15921,6 
5 Korea 22380,59 5 Korea 15711,99 
6 Brunei 22339,15 6 Sweden 14626,4 
7 Japan 21773,86 7 Japan 14457,03 
8 Sweden 21485,67 8 Bahrain 13738,81 
9 Switzerland 20921,74 9 Switzerland 13642,08 
10 France 20798,73 10 Canada 13484,41 
11 Canada 20379,95 11 France 13306,56 
12 Germany 20379,05 12 Belgium 13228,11 
13 Belgium 20373,69 13 Germany 13222,3 
14 Bahrain 19832,6 14 Netherlands 12658,63 
15 Netherlands 19746,86 15 Austria 12568,3 
16 United Kingdom 19721,48 16 Ireland 12531,41 
17 Austria 19691,9 17 United Kingdom 12182,73 
18 Ireland 19636,84 18 Chile 12173,38 
19 Italy 19477,23 19 Spain 12140,64 
20 Spain 19143,76 20 Italy 12105,17 
21 United States 19070,12 21 Argentina 11933,37 
22 India 18568,25 22 Slovenia 11867,11 
23 Slovenia 18560,42 23 Brunei 11759,78 
24 Taiwan 18512,93 24 United States 11728,57 
25 Chile 18289,87 25 Cyprus 11700,56 
26 New Zealand 18155,27 26 New Zealand 11497,67 
27 Argentina 18078 27 Venezuela 11483,96 
28 Cyprus 17877 28 Hungary 11464 
29 Oman 17846,51 29 South Africa 11446,31 
30 South Africa 17836 30 Czech Republic 11337,26 
31 Czech Republic 17784,71 31 Taiwan 11291,54 
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32 Colombia 17714,5 32 Oman 11212,62 
33 Hong Kong 17604,58 33 Denmark 11140,57 
34 Israel 17543,33 34 Slovak Republic 11120,05 
35 Denmark 17482,24 35 Poland 10986,38 
36 Singapore 17388,02 36 Israel 10922,11 
37 Greece 17333,18 37 Barbados 10570,14 
38 Hungary 17298,59 38 Colombia 10543,06 
39 Mauritius 17088,85 39 Greece 10496,26 
40 Poland 17070,54 40 Turkey 10366,78 
41 Barbados 16631,11 41 Mauritius 10331,37 
42 Slovak Republic 16585,39 42 Ukraine 10319,52 
43 Australia 16514,49 43 Australia 10309,06 
44 Mexico 16361,67 44 Hong Kong 10284,76 
45 Russia 16295,61 45 Mexico 10120,12 
46 Costa Rica 16150,27 46 Costa Rica 10102,59 
47 Iceland 16082,13 47 Russia 9974,866 
48 Venezuela 16057,87 48 Botswana 9822,465 
49 Turkey 16038,96 49 Portugal 9804,444 
50 Iran 15734,89 50 Egypt 9785,177 
51 El Salvador 15666,9 51 Singapore 9783,059 
52 Estonia 15613,23 52 Iceland 9758,595 
53 Ukraine 15560,74 53 India 9748,749 
54 Thailand 15553,86 54 Belarus 9649,398 
55 Lithuania 15520,25 55 Kazakhstan 9646,358 
56 Egypt 15456,26 56 Lithuania 9631,879 
57 Guatemala 15346,72 57 Estonia 9625,252 
58 Croatia 15121,84 58 Iran 9569,189 
59 Pakistan 15068,41 59 Saudi Arabia 9521,063 
60 Jordan 14975,26 60 Thailand 9502,681 
61 Trinidad and Tobago 14901,49 61 Latvia 9438,624 
62 Latvia 14873,55 62 El Salvador 9405,976 
63 Saudi Arabia 14852,22 63 Trinidad and Tobago 9395,963 
64 Moldova 14825,56 64 Croatia 9350,608 
65 Belarus 14798,28 65 Jordan 9311,616 
66 Bahamas, The 14771,84 66 Guatemala 9282,32 
67 Indonesia 14750,69 67 Romania 9259,171 
68 Romania 14620,9 68 Tunisia 9175,367 
69 Panama 14608,3 69 Panama 9095,422 
70 China 14584,94 70 Armenia 9043,245 
71 Portugal 14569,59 71 Jamaica 9013,36 
72 Bulgaria 14393,64 72 Dominica 9000,134 
73 Tunisia 14365,75 73 Indonesia 8944,04 
74 Jamaica 14329,23 74 Pakistan 8774,55 
75 Yemen 14326,89 75 Moldova 8747,379 
76 Botswana 14265,03 76 Bulgaria 8678,388 
77 Armenia 14154,65 77 Cape Verde 8581,709 
78 Senegal 14077,52 78 Brazil 8564,596 
79 Brazil 13997,86 79 St. Lucia 8435,741 
80 Zambia 13879,98 80 Bosnia and Herzegovina 8396,358 
81 Kazakhstan 13818,09 81 Grenada 8383,289 
82 Uruguay 13749,01 82 Seychelles 8320,99 
83 St. Lucia 13496,18 83 Algeria 8155,92 
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84 Rwanda 13477,47 84 China 8119,719 
85 Seychelles 13451,48 85 Albania 8018,037 
86 Syrian Arab Republic 13402,44 86 St. Vincent and the Gren. 8012,07 
87 Cape Verde 13354,24 87 Morocco 8004,121 
88 Honduras 13345,84 88 Malaysia 7983,577 
89 Vietnam 13330,61 89 Uruguay 7937,736 
90 Bosnia and Herzegovina 13289,23 90 Philippines 7924,802 
91 Philippines 13273,2 91 Bahamas, The 7852,352 
92 Niger 13236,91 92 Senegal 7829,287 
93 Kenya 13162,1 93 Honduras 7669,274 
94 St. Vincent and the Gren. 12841,44 94 Vietnam 7656,281 
95 Paraguay 12734,26 95 Georgia 7648,751 
96 Malaysia 12716,61 96 Azerbaijan 7492,909 
97 Dominica 12441,45 97 Syrian Arab Republic 7260,752 
98 Peru 12386,96 98 Fiji 7249,634 
99 Albania 12248,44 99 Zambia 7207,683 
100 Nicaragua 12192,08 100 Ecuador 7061,884 
101 Kyrgyz Republic 12091,13 101 Nicaragua 7009,41 
102 Fiji 11885,88 102 Belize 7006,438 
103 Morocco 11800,92 103 Peru 6882,272 
104 St. Kitts and Nevis 11762,3 104 Kyrgyz Republic 6753,532 
105 Georgia 11705,9 105 Paraguay 6725,222 
106 Tanzania 11611,51 106 Kenya 6425,371 
107 Mali 11522,88 107 Bolivia 6419,966 
108 Azerbaijan 11427,88 108 Yemen 6338,666 
109 Malta 11340,04 109 Sudan 5945,445 
110 Algeria 11221,24 110 St. Kitts and Nevis 5942,517 
111 Ecuador 11053,4 111 Rwanda 5897,564 
112 Grenada 10805,49 112 Tanzania 5890,948 
113 Madagascar 10729,89 113 Gabon 5770,08 
114 Sudan 10697,08 114 Madagascar 5580,727 
115 Bolivia 10506,86 115 Niger 5456,364 
116 Mozambique 10152,58 116 Mozambique 5443,43 
117 Belize 9896,694 117 Malta 5179,667 
118 Namibia 9829,207 118 Mali 5174,053 
119 Malawi 9605,341 119 Namibia 4785,479 
120 Gabon 9108,562 120 Mongolia 4721,168 
121 Uganda 8890,616 121 Cameroon 4444,676 
122 Burundi 8782,701 122 Malawi 4443,332 
123 Mongolia 8423,455 123 Guyana 4160,016 
124 Guyana 7931,663 124 Ghana 4101,758 
125 Cameroon 7741,223 125 Uganda 4095,914 
126 Ghana 7695,794 126 Gambia, The 3145,891 
127 Gambia, The 6957,633 127 Burundi 2765,331 
128 Maldives 3778,273 128 Maldives 2633,801 
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Appendix 3: Export market shares 
 
Country Ind.RW 
Ind.RW 
(Con) 
Ind.RW 
(NC) 
Paper & 
Paperboard  Sawnwood Wood Pulp 
Afghanistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Albania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Algeria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
American Samoa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Andorra 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Angola 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Antigua and Barbuda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Argentina 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Armenia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Aruba 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Australia 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Austria 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,05 0,00 
Azerbaijan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bahamas 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bahrain 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bangladesh 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Barbados 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Belarus 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 
Belgium 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,02 
Belize 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Benin 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bhutan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bolivia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bosnia and Herzegov. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
Brazil 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,14 
British Indian Ocean 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
British Virgin Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Brunei Darussalam 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bulgaria 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Burkina Faso 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Burundi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cambodia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cameroon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Canada 0,04 0,05 0,01 0,12 0,28 0,24 
Cape Verde 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cayman Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Central African Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Chad 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Chile 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,06 
China 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,00 
Christmas Island 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Colombia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Comoros 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Congo 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cook Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Costa Rica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Côte d'Ivoire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Croatia 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cuba 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cyprus 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Czech Republic 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Denmark 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Djibouti 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Dominica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Dominican Republic 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ecuador 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Egypt 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
El Salvador 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Equatorial Guinea 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Eritrea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Estonia 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 
Ethiopia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Falkland Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Faroe Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Fiji 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Finland 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,11 0,06 0,06 
France 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,01 
French Guiana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
French Polynesia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gabon 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gambia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Georgia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Germany 0,06 0,07 0,04 0,09 0,07 0,02 
Ghana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gibraltar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Greece 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Greenland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Grenada 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guadeloupe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guatemala 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guinea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guinea-Bissau 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guyana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Haiti 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Honduras 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Hungary 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Iceland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
India 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Indonesia 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,06 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Iraq 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ireland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Israel 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Italy 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 
Jamaica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Japan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Jordan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Kazakhstan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Kenya 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Korea DPR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Korea, Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 
Kuwait 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Kyrgyzstan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lao DPR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Latvia 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,02 0,00 
Lebanon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Liberia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Liechtenstein 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lithuania 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 
Luxembourg 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Madagascar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malawi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malaysia 0,04 0,00 0,10 0,00 0,02 0,00 
Maldives 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mali 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malta 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Martinique 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mauritania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mauritius 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mexico 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Moldova 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mongolia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Montenegro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Morocco 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mozambique 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Myanmar 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nauru 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nepal 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Netherlands 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,01 
Netherlands Antilles 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
New Caledonia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
New Zealand 0,04 0,07 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 
Nicaragua 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Niger 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nigeria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Niue 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Norfolk Island 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Norway 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 
Oman 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Pakistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Palau 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Panama 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Papua New Guinea 0,02 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Paraguay 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Peru 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Philippines 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Pitcairn 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Poland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Portugal 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,02 
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Qatar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Réunion 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Romania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 
Russian Federation 0,39 0,43 0,30 0,02 0,12 0,04 
Rwanda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Helena 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Pierre and Miq. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Vincent and Gren. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Samoa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sao Tome and Principe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saudi Arabia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Senegal 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Serbia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Seychelles 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sierra Leone 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Singapore 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Slovakia 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Slovenia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Solomon Islands 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Somalia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
South Africa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 
Spain 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,02 
Sri Lanka 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sudan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Suriname 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Swaziland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sweden 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,09 0,10 0,07 
Switzerland 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Syrian Arab Republic 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tajikistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tanzania, United Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Thailand 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Macedonia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Timor-Leste 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Togo 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tonga 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tunisia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Turkey 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Turkmenistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Turks and Caicos Isl. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tuvalu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Uganda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ukraine 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 
United Arab Emirates 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
United Kingdom 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
U.S.A. 0,07 0,09 0,05 0,08 0,03 0,13 
Uruguay 0,02 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Uzbekistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Wake Is 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Vanuatu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Venezuela 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Viet Nam 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Yemen 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Zambia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Zimbabwe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
 
Appendix 4: Import market shares 
 
Portion of world imports Ind. RW 
Ind. 
RW(Con) 
Ind. RW 
(NC)  
Paper and 
Paperboard Wood Pulp Sawnwood 
Afghanistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Albania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Algeria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
American Samoa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Andorra 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Angola 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Antigua and Barbuda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Argentina 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Armenia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Aruba 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Australia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Austria 0,07 0,09 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,01 
Azerbaijan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bahamas 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bahrain 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bangladesh 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Barbados 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Belarus 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Belgium 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,02 
Belize 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Benin 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bhutan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bolivia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bosnia and Herzegov. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Botswana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Brazil 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 
British Indian Ocean Ter 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
British Virgin Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Brunei Darussalam 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Bulgaria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Burkina Faso 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Burundi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cambodia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cameroon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Canada 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,01 
Cape Verde 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cayman Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Central African Republic 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Chad 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Chile 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
China 0,26 0,24 0,28 0,07 0,20 0,06 
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Christmas Island 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Colombia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Comoros 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Congo 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cook Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Costa Rica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Côte d'Ivoire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Croatia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cuba 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Cyprus 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Czech Republic 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Denmark 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 
Djibouti 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Dominica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Dominican Republic 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ecuador 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Egypt 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 
El Salvador 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Equatorial Guinea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Eritrea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Estonia 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Ethiopia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Falkland Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Faroe Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Fiji 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Finland 0,11 0,09 0,15 0,00 0,01 0,00 
France 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,05 0,03 
French Guiana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
French Polynesia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
French Southern Terr 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gabon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gambia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Georgia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Germany 0,03 0,04 0,01 0,08 0,12 0,04 
Ghana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Gibraltar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Greece 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 
Greenland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Grenada 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guadeloupe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guatemala 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guinea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guinea-Bissau 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Guyana 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Haiti 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Honduras 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Hungary 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 
Iceland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
India 0,03 0,01 0,07 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Indonesia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 
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Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Iraq 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ireland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Israel 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Italy 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,08 0,06 
Jamaica 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Japan 0,08 0,11 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,07 
Jordan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Kazakhstan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Kenya 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Kiribati 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Korea, D.P.R. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Korea, Rep. 0,05 0,07 0,01 0,01 0,05 0,01 
Kuwait 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Kyrgyzstan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lao P.D.R. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Latvia 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lebanon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lesotho 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Liberia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Liechtenstein 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Lithuania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Luxembourg 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Madagascar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malawi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malaysia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,01 
Maldives 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mali 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Malta 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Marshall Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Martinique 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mauritania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mauritius 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mexico 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 
Micronesia, Fed.  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Moldova 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Mongolia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Montenegro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Montserrat 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Morocco 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Mozambique 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Myanmar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nauru 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nepal 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Netherlands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 
Netherlands Antilles 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
New Caledonia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
New Zealand 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nicaragua 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Niger 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Nigeria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Niue 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Norfolk Island 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Northern Mariana Isl. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Norway 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 
Oman 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Pakistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Palau 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Panama 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Papua New Guinea 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Paraguay 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Peru 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Philippines 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Pitcairn 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Poland 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,00 
Portugal 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Qatar 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Réunion 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Romania 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Russian Federation 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Rwanda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Helena 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Lucia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Pierre and Miquel. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saint Vincent and Gren. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Samoa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sao Tome and Principe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Saudi Arabia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 
Senegal 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Serbia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Seychelles 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sierra Leone 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Singapore 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Slovakia 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Slovenia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Solomon Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Somalia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
South Africa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Spain 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,04 0,02 0,03 
Sri Lanka 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sudan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Suriname 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Swaziland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sweden 0,05 0,04 0,07 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Switzerland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Syrian Arab Rep. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tajikistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tanzania 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Thailand 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Macedonia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Timor-Leste 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Togo 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Tokelau 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tonga 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tunisia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Turkey 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 
Turkmenistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Turks and Caicos Isl. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tuvalu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Uganda 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Ukraine 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
United Arab Emirates 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
United Kingdom 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,03 0,06 
U.S.A. 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,14 0,14 0,31 
Uruguay 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
US Virgin Islands 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Uzbekistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Wake Is 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Wallis and Futuna Isl. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Vanuatu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Venezuela 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Western Sahara 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Viet Nam 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
World + 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
Yemen 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Zambia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Zimbabwe 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
